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ORGANIZED CRIME: CHALLENGE TO THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM
Part I-Organized Crime: The Nature of Its Threat, The Reasons for Its Survival
EARL JOHNSON, JR.
Mr. Johnson is a Special Attorney in the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section of the United
States Department of Justice.* After receiving his J.D. degree from the University of Chicago Law
School in 1960, Mr. Johnson became a Ford Foundation Fellow in Criminal Law at the Northwestern
University School of Law, where he received his LL.M. degree in 1961.
The following article and two further installments which will appear in subsequent issues of the
Journal are based upon a thesis which the author prepared while a graduate student at Northwestern.
The first installment contains an assessment of the effects of organized crime on American society
and an analysis of the factors which have made organized crime difficult to suppress through tradi-
tional methods of law enforcement. The second installment will summarize the various legal counter-
measures available to an honest prosecutor-particularly a local prQsecutor-in combating organized
crime. These measures involve techniques designed to weaken criminal organizations through con-
victing their leaders, reducing their profits, and denying them access to services and facilities
necessary to their illegal enterprises. The third installment will be a survey of the legal countermeas-
ures available to minimize the effects of political corruption upon the prosecutive effort against or-
ganized crime. This survey will encompass means for substituting another prosecutive agency where
the local prosecutor is corrupt or ineffectual, sanctions to discourage a corrupt official from improper
acts, methods of minimizing the effects of improper acts when they do occur, and techniques to maxi-
mize the effect of an honest official where others in the law enforcement machinery are under the
control of organized crime.-EDroTR.
America has a new folklore. Unfortunately,
this folklore is not made up of oft-repeated legends
from a safe and misty past. This folklore has grown
up around the heavily shrouded, perennially profit-
able, often bloody doings of a present day phe-
nomenon-organized crime. Next to westerns,
war, and sex, it is probably the chief source of
material for TV plots,' books-both fiction2 and
non-fiction-, and newspaper exposs.4 The names
* The views expressed in this article are the views of
the author and are not meant to reflect those of the
United States Department of Justice or the Organized
Crime and Racketeering Section of that Department.
I Among continuing series which have devoted all
or many of their episodes to the exploits of organized
crime and those who struggle against organized crime
are: "The Untouchables," ABC-TV; "Asphalt Jungle,"
ABC-TV; "Tightrope," CBS-TV; "Cain's Hundred,"
NBC-TV; "Target: The Corruptors," ACB-TV;
"D.A.'s Man," NBC-TV.
2 E.g., HUNTER, THE ASPHALT JUNGLE (1947);
ROBERTS, NEVER LOVE A STRANGER (1948); BOTEEN,
THE PROSECUTOR (1953); DELEEUW, UNDERWORLD
STORY (1955).
Among the non-fiction works, many of which are
authored by men who were personally involved in law
enforcement efforts against organized crime or con-
gressional investigations, are the following: ABA,
of "Scarface" Al Capone, Frank "The Enforcer"
Nitti, Tony Accardo, Frank Costello, and "Lucky"
Luciano5 have become as familiar to most present
REPORT ON ORGANIZD CRME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
(1952-53); ANSLINGER, THE MURDERERS: THE STORY
or THE NARCOTIC GANGS (1961); ASBURY, GANGS OF
NEW YORK (1927); Coox, A TWo DOLLAR BET MEANS
MURDER (1961); DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL'S CONFERENCE ON ORGANIZED CRIME (1951);
.FEDER AND JOESTEN, THE LUCIANO STORY (1954);
IREY, Tn TAX DODGERS (1948); KEFAUVER, CRIME
TN AMERICA (1951); KENNEDY, R., THE ENEMY
WITHIN (1960); LYLE, THE DRY AND LAWLESS YEARS
(1960); MULLADY & KOFOED, MEET THE MOB (1961);
NESS, THE UNTOUCHABLES (1957); PETERSON, BAR-
BARIANS IN OUR MIDST (1952); PETERSON, GAMBLING,
SHOULD IT BE LEGALIZED? (1945); RECKLESS, THE
CRIME PROBLEM 180-207 (3d ed. 1961); RICE, THE
BUsiNEss OF CRIME (1956); SMI, SYNDICATE CITY
(1954); SONDERN, BROTHERHOOD OF EVIL: THE MAFIA
(1959); TuRKus, MURDER, INC. (1951); TYLER,
ORGANIZED CRIME IN AMERICA (1962).
4 See, e.g., the syndicated columns of Lester Velie and
Victor Reisel.
5 For an interesting article concerning the derivation
and function of the colorful monikers which have been
attached to some leading figures in organized crime,
see Anderson, What's in a Nickname, Parade Magazine,
June 3, 1962, pp. 20-21.
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day Americans as Pocohantas, Jesse James, "Wild
Bill" Hickock, Paul.Bunyon, or Nathan Hale.
It is not the purpose of this article to add to
this "new folklore" of organized crime. The em-
phasis will not be placed on faultlessly executed
gangland murders, ingenious narcotics smuggling
schemes, or the splendorous standard of living
enjoyed by some crime overlords. These exploits
of organized crime have been accurately and ex-
haustively explored in a number of highly pub-
licized congressional investigations6 and popu-
larized in various non-fiction books, many of which
have become bestsellers.7 Nor will the daring
exploits of some individual prosecutor or under-
cover agent be recounted, nor the few semi-suc-
cessful crusades against organized crime which
have sporadically sputtered in some of our large
cities. The heroes of this article are neither crime
lords nor public servants; they are the legal tech-
niques which have been used 6r could be used to
bring organized crime to its collective knees.
The article will be divided into three install-
ments. In this first installment an attempt will be
made to evaluate the threat of organized crime
to American society and to probe the factors con-
tributing to its seeming invincibility. The two
remaining installments, which are to appear in
forthcoming issues of the Journal, will be devoted
to a presentation and assessment of various legal
counter-measures through which the threat of
organized crime can be minimized.
I. THE IMPACT OF ORGANIZED CRIME ON
AMERICAN SOCIETY
Organized crime in America has been variously
described as a wing of the Sicilian Mafia, as non-
'Senate Select Comm. on Improper Activities in
the Labor or Management Field (McClellan Commit-
tee), Hearings (58 parts), REPORTS (2 Interim, 1 Final)
(1957-1960) (hereinafter referred to as Senate Select
Comm.); Special Senate Comm. to Investigate Organ-
ized Crime in Interstate Commerce (Kefauver Com-
mittee), Hearings (19 parts in 9 volumes), REPORT (4
parts in 1 volume) (1950-1951) (hereinafter referred
to as Special Senate Comm.); Subcomm. on Improve-
ments in the Federal Criminal Code (Daniels Commit-
tee), Hearings (10 parts), REPORT (1955-56); U. S.
Nat'l. Com'n. on Law Observance and Enforcement
(Wickersham Committee), DIGEST, REPORTS (3
volumes), RECORDS ( volumes) (1933-1934).
7 Among books cohcerning organized crime which
have reached the bestseller lists are: KENNEDY, R.,THE
ENEY WITHIN (1960); SONDERN, BROTHERHOOD OF
EVIL: THE MAFIA (1959); KEFAUVER, CRME IN
AMERICA (1951).
8 "Behind the local mobs which make up the national
crime syndicate is a shadowy, international criminal
organization known as the Mafia, so fantastic that most
existent,9 as big business, 0 as a disappearing phe-
nomenon," as a number of local gangs,12 as an in-
Americans find it hard to believe it really exists."
KEPAJVER, op. sit. supra note 7, at 14. One entire book
is devoted to suggesting and establishing this thesis.
SONDERN, op. cit. supra note 7. See also, ANSLiNGER,
op cit supra note 3.
9 "For years, political leaders and police executives
... continued to deny the existence of organized crime
in Chicago. The Capone gang was a myth, they said.
At the attorney general's conference on organized
crime held in Washington, D. C., on February 15,
1950, the official spokesman for the city of Chicago
expressed indignation when reference was made to the
Capone gang. Said this official, 'I do not know the
Capone Syndicate exists.' PETERSON, BARBARIANS IN
OUR MIDST 271 (1952).
0 " 'Big business' is the descriptive phrase for
crime in the St. Louis area...." KEFAuvER, op. cit.
supra note 7, at 160.
u1 "With the rationalization and absorption of some
illicit activities into the structure of the economy, the
passing of an older generation that had established a
hegemony over crime, the general rise of minority
groups to social position, and the breakup of the urban
boss system, the pattern of crime we have discussed is
passing as well. Crime, of course, remains as long as
passion and the desire for gain remain. But the kind of
big, organized city crime, as we have known it for the
past seventy-five years, was based on more than these
universal motives. It was based on certain charac-
teristics of the American economy, American ethnic
groups, and American politics. The changes in all
these areas mean that, in the form we have known it,
it too will change." BELt., THE END or IDEOLOGY 150
(1960).
This general thesis, that organized crime is a product
of certain temporary economic and social forces and
will disappear as these forces dissipate, is the subject
of Chapter 7 of Mr. Bell's book which was drawn from
his article in the Antioch Review, Summer, 1953. This
optimistic view of the future natural decline and disap-
pearance of organized crime unfortunately does not
comport with the facts as they have developed in the
nine years which have elapsed since the article was
prepared. Illegal gambling revenues remain at an
astronomical level ($11 billion estimated in The Nation,
Oct. 22, 1960); more gangland killings occurred in
Chicago in 1961 than any year since 1935, PETERSON,
A REPORT ON CHICAGO CRIMx FOR 1961, 27 (1962);
and younger men are eagerly seizing the reins of power
from the older generation of gangland chieftains wher-
ever and whenever the latter pass from the scene due
to retirement, imprisonment, or death (e.g., the current
leading challenger for control of organized crime in
Southern California is Joseph Matranga, age 40, accord-
ing to a recent Drew Pearson column in the Washington
Post, February 9, 1962, p. B 11). Nor is Mr. Bell's
conclusion supported by the findings of a more recent
and more exhaustive sociological evaluation of organized
crime in which the future development of organized
crime is summarized in the following terms:
"What was true in the 1930's is true in the 1960's,
guaranteeing the underworld with an institutional
longevity extending far beyond the natural life span
of its more mortal leadership.
"The delinquent culture becomes an inner frontier,
raising barbarians in our midst, strange and hostile to
our larger civilization. Out of this culture comes the
young gang that in adulthood becomes part of organized
crime in America, either by absorption or by conquest.
[Vol. 53
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dependent class in our society,13 as a tightly-knit
national syndicate, 4 as a vast conspiracy to ob-
struct justice15 and as a way of doing business.16
However, for the purposes of this article criminal
organizations may be differentiated from ordinary
criminal individuals and groups by resort to a more
elementary definition. As used in this article, a
criminal organization is a group of considerable
size which engages in continuous criminal activity
over a long, usually indefinite, period of time."
"Organized crime, then, is not a thing of the past;
nor is it a tamed beast for the present; it is a powerful,
ever renewed social force with whih America will have
to contend for many years to come." TYLER, ORGANIZED
CRImE IN AmERICA 366, 372-73 (1962). (Emphasis
supplied.)
12 "I spent some two weeks in New York, Washing-
ton and Chicago running down every clue to the so-
called Mafia that I could find. I talked to a large
number of Federal, state and local law enforcement
authorities; to police, reporters, attorneys, detectives,
non-profit civic groups such as the Chicago Crime
Commission .... The generally held belief is that
there is no tightly knit syndicate, but instead a loose
"trade association" of criminals in various cities and
areas, who run their own shows in their own fields but
have matters of mutual interest to take up (as at the
Appalachian conference).' " Serrell Hillman, Time
magazine reporter, quoted in BELL, op. cit. supra
note 11, at 140. Among the adherents to this position
is no less than J. Edgar Hoover, whose views were
summarized in his statement in the January, 1962,
Law Enforcement Bulletin, "No single individual or
coalition of racketeers dominates organized crime
across the nation. There are, however, loose connections
among controlling groups in various areas....
13 "The underworld is no longer an ugly hood, a
muscle for hire to any master, but an independent
power, vying with other great classes and movements
in America for wealth and influence in our culture."
TYLER, op. cit. supra note 11, at 237.
14 "A nationwide crime syndicate does exist in the
United States of America, despite the protestations of
a strangely assorted company of criminals, self-serving
politicians, plain blind fools, and others who may be
honestly misguided, that there is no such combine."
KEFAUVER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 12.
Is "The crime of a syndicate is obstruction of
justice. But it is obstruction of justice in general,
prosecutable normally only when its actions interfere
with some specific legal proceeding." Special Group on
Organized Crime in the United States, Report to the
Attorney General, February 10, 1959, Hearings Before
Subcommittee No. 5 of the Committee on the J-udiciary,
House of Representatives, ser. no. 16, 87th Cong. 1st
Seas., at 104 (1961).
16 "[O]rganized crime in its modern form is not a
special field of activity rather it is a technique of
violence, intimidation and corruption which in default
of effective law enforcement can be successfully applied
by those sufficiently unscrupulous to any business or
industry which produces large profits." Olney, Federal,
State and Local Cooperation in Law Enforcement,
ABA, REPORT ON ORGANIZED CRIME AND LAW EN-
FORcEMENT 272 (1952-1953).
17 A more detailed list of typical characteristics was
suggested by the Attorney General's Special Group on
The size of the organization will vary, being com-
prised of enough members to maintain a monopoly
in its chosen fields of endeavor in a selected geo-
graphical area. The phases of criminal conduct
which the organization may enter likewise will
vary greatly. But ordinarily an organization will
concentrate its efforts in the distribution of illegal
commodities and services. Moreover, a single or-
ganization typically will diversify with substantial
interests in several lines of illegal activity. The
most constant and unique element in the definition
of a criminal organization is the duration of the
group's intended existence. Unlike most criminal
groups but like most business enterprises, a crim-
inal organization contemplates a continuous in-
definite life-span.
Admittedly, the foregoing is merely a silhouette
definition of organized crime. Within the dimen-
sions of size, occupation, and time which are shared
by all criminal organizations are highlights and
shadings which characterize the vast majority.
During the course of this article other generaliza-
tions will be offered concerning the nature of or-
ganized crime and its mode of operation. These
are generalizations which apply to most but not
all criminal organizations.
At present there is a vocal controversy raging
among experts in law enforcement over the exist-
ence of a Mafia or a national syndicate which
dominates organized crime throughout the coun-
try.18 It is irrelevant to the purposes of this article
Organized Crime in their "definition of a crime syndi-
cate."
" .. [For] purposes of.discussion in this report, a
crime syndicate is defined as a group having most of
the followirig characteristics, although not necessarily
all of them:
(1) A substantial number of members.
(2) A large gross volume of operations.
(3) Interstate operations involving at least a sub-
stantial geographical part of the Nation.
(4) Operations on several vertical levels, such as
supplier, manufacturer, wholesaler and retailer;
members separated by two or more levels of opera-
tion frequently not knowing the identity of each
other.
(5) Major beneficial interest and management divorced
from operation, with top leadership engaging
primarily in crimes of conspiracy or of aiding and
abetting.
(6) Membership usually engaging in more than one
kind of criminal activity.
(7) Membership habitually engaging in similar criminal
conduct, and relying on it as a primary source of
income." Special Group on Organized Crime in the
United States, op. sit. supra note 15, at 103.
's The primary proponent of the theory that or-
ganized crime in America consists of a national criminal
organization dominated by a Sicilian group called the
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whether there is one large nation-wide criminal
organization or a number of local ones. It is equally
immaterial whether it is controlled by the Mafia.
Centralized or not, Mafia or not, it is still a "broth-
erhood of evil."' 9 Regardless of the degree of co-
Mafia is the Bureau of Narcotics. The Bureau reports
that "on the basis of our official investigations that
extend over a 30 year period, we have amassed con-
clusive evidence of the existence of the Mafia, and
consider this secret international society a threat...."
Quoted in TYLER, op. cit. supra note 11. The Kefauver
Committee concluded on the basis of its investigations
and the testimony of the Bureau of Narcotics that the
Mafia controls organized crime in the United States.
Other leading observers of organized crime, including
Virgil Peterson, Operating Director of the Chicago
Crime Commission, discount both the Mafia and the
concept of a single unified national criminal organiza-
tion. Persons in this camp generally subscribe to the
view that organized crime is basically comprised of
many local criminal organizations, each holding sway
over a single metropolitan area. To sustain this posi-
tion, these observers point to the fact that many
non-Sicilians play a leading role in organized crime.
Even Al Capone was not a Sicilian but an Italian. The
occasional conferences attended by members from
criminal organizations across the country such as the
famous Apalachin meeting in 1958 are explained away
as being analogous to "trade conventions" for the
purpose of exchanging information and allowing
delegates to form incidental cooperative ventures
with other independent criminal organizations from
other sections of the country.
A possible explanation for the sharp conflict between
these honest and knowledgeable observers may be found
in their differing perspectives. The Bureau of Narcotics
views the institution of organized crime virtually
solely as it participates in the narcotics traffic. The
narcotics traffic, in turn, requires a high degree
of cooperation between persons located at different
geographical locations in order to accomplish the many
steps involved in producing, processing, importing,
reprocessing and distributing this particular product.
Moreover, it necessitates international connections,
since most narcotics are grown in the Mediterranean
and the Far East. Therefore, it would be natural to
expect this phase of organized crime's illegitimate
activities to be dominated by a group which retained
strong ties in the Mediterranean. The Sicilian members
of a criminal organization are ideally suited for this.
Moreover, it would be logical to expect that criminal
organizations engaged in the narcotics traffic would
display a high degree of cooperation and coordination
in that phase of their activilies. At the same time, the
same criminal organizations might be running their
gambling operations and other illegal enterprises
without any consultation with organizations in other
areas of the nation. Thus, completely independent ob-
servers focusing their attention on these other activities
of a criminal organization would be lead to the con-
clusion that it was a completely independent organism
unconnected with organized crime in other sections.
19 It has been observed that whatever its name or
scope, organized crime adheres to the same practices
and principles as the legendary Mafia of Sicily. "Even
the famous code of omera-with its great wall of
silence is not peculiarly Sicilian. It is the universal
code of the underworld.... The only aspect that is
distinctly Sicilian is the word itself-omerta. . .
TYLER, op. cit. supra note 11, at 332.
ordination between the organizations located in
various sections of our country, the destructive
results which have been attained by organized
crime call for special consideration and special
treatment.
A. The Diversion of Income from Legitimate and
Socially Useful Outlets
In assessing the destructive effects of organized
crime, the obvious starting point is the financial
tribute it exacts from our society. This is money
diverted from the stream of legitimate commerce,
from useful products and services, from education
and medical care, from honest businessmen and
needy families, into the coffers of organized crime0
At the present time, criminal organizations ap-
pear most active in six fields of endeavor-illegal
gambling, the distribution of narcotics, racketeer-
ing, prostitution, "shylocking," and the infiltration
of legitimate business. Of these, gambling is the
leading source of organization revenue, accounting
for probably half of- organization profits." It has
been estimated that illegal gambling grosses from
seven to twenty billion dollars annually.2 The
narcotics traffic, which yields probably the highest
rate of net profit,2 has been estimated to involve
20The legitimate sector of the American economy
always suffers a net loss from the operation of organized
crime. For instance, although the legitimate businesses
located in a city which attracts tourists because of its
illegal gambling spas may appear to benefit from the
existance of organized crime, legitimate commerce as a
whole loses revenue. The money spent in the gambling
tourist city obviously is money which otherwise would
have been spent in legitimate businesses in the home
cities of the tourists. Only a portion of these diverted
funds reaches hotels, restaurants, and other legitimate
outlets in the tourist city. The rest is lost at the gaming
tables and thus removed from the channels of legitimate
commerce.
21 "[T]he reports of the California Crime Study
Commission and the Senate Committee establish with
equal clarity that illegal gambling has been the principal
source of profits and the backbone of organized crime
during the twenty years since the repeal of Prohibition
and up to the present time." Olney, supra note 16, at
273.
2"Gambling in the United States, we estimate
involves about 70,000 persons and a gross volume of $7
billion, annually." Statement of Attorney General
Robert F. Kennedy, tHearings Before Subcomnillee
No. 5, supra note 15, at 24.
"In all, the committee figures conservatively that
S20 billion changes hands every year in the United
States as a result of organized illegal gambling.. .. "
Special Senate Comm., SEcoND INTERIM REPORT,
op. cit. supra note 6, at 13-14. The reasoning upon
which this estimate is based is set forth on page 13 of
the Report. A third estimate of S1l billion annually
was made in The Nation, Oct. 22, 1960.
23 Some appreciation of the tremendous profits which
the distribution of narcotics yields can be obtained
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gross sales of 300 million dollars per year.U Racket-
eering, although an element in many phases of
organization actigity, is herein limited to exaction
of payments from legitimate businesses and unions
through extortion and other more subtle though
equally effective pressures.2 5 As thus defined, evi-
dence indicates that racketeering may be a source
of over one billion dollars in additional revenue.26
On the other hand, prostitution, at one time a
major organization enterprise, apparently has
dwindled in importance as independents and pos-
sibly amateurs have cut deeply into the market.Y
The newest and most rapidly expanding spheres
of organization operations are "shylocking" and
the ownership of legitimate businesses. "Shy-
locking" or "loan sharking" is the loaning of money
from a comparison of the cost of these narcotics to a
criminal organization and the price at which it sells
this product to the addict. Commissioner Anslinger of
the Bureau of Narcotics testified before the Daniels
Committee concerning this feature of the narcotics
traffic, as follows:
"So you get heroin from additional sources like
Lebanon.... You could buy an ounce for $100. By the
time it reached the illicit market, the retailer, the user,
he would pay roughly in the nature of between $3,000
and S4,000 for an ounce." Hearings Before the Sub-
committee on Improvements in the Federal Criminal
Code, supra note 6, at 36.
21 Commissioner Anslinger estimated the traffic in
heroin alone to gross between $300 and S400 million
dollars per year. Ibid.
25 The most familiar form of racketeering against
legitimate business is the hoary practice of collecting
"protection money" from the businessman to insure
that the protectors will not injure his person or property.
This racket has been traced back at least to Lord Clive,
founder of the British Empire in India, who in his
youth formed a gang of fellow delinquents to collect
tribute from shopowners who did not wish to have
their windows broken. See Peterson, Rackets in
America, 49 J. Cras. L., C. & P.S. 583 (1959).
The advent of labor unions has added more subtle
devices to the arsenal of racketeering techniques and
has afforded the racketeer an additional class of victims
as well. By founding or gaining control of a union, a
criminal organization can use the threat of an organiza-
tional campaign or a strike to exact payments from
business victims. At the same time, it can fleece the
union members by requiring exhorbitant dues and
assessments and by embezzling union funds. This form
of racketeering came in for close scrutiny during the
lengthy McClellan Committee hearings. See generally,
Senate Select Comm., REPORTS (2 Interim, 1 Final),
op cit. supra note 6; KENNEDY, op. cit. supra note 7.
26 "Robert F. Kennedy, counsel for the McClellan
Senate Committee, has asserted that the underworld
is milking a billion dollars a year out of the labor-
management rackets." Peterson, supra note 25, at 583.
2 See, BELL, op. cit. supra note 11, at 149. In certain
areas of the country, prostitution appears still to be
conducted on a well organized basis with the local
criminal organization in control. See, BALTrmOE
CRIINAL JUSTICE CoM'N, THIRTY-NIN ANUAL
REPORT 17-19, 21-27 (1961).
at usurious rates of interest, rates which may run
in excess of 150%.2 Since such loans are not
legally collectible and contravene criminal laws
in most states, this is a natural field for organized
crime, which has the means of enforcing payment
without resort to the courts and has no compunc-
tion about violating criminal statutes. The prev-
alence of "shylocking" among criminal organiza-
tions in various sections of the country suggests
that it represents a substantial portion of the
multibillion dollar take of organized crime. How-
ever, its advent as an important source of profit
post-dates most of the congressional hearings, and
no one has hazarded a guess concerning the total
gross receipts or net profit derived by criminal
organizations from "shylocking" activities.29
Legitimate business is another area in which
organized crime appears to be extending its in-
fluence at an ever increasing pace.30 In many cities,
it dominates the fields of juke-box and vending
machine distribution. Laundry services,n liquor
2 "On the suggestion of Charlie Bemoff, Mishel
and Bemoff started loaning cash, a practice which
Mishel described as "shylocking." This consisted of
lending money at illegal rates of interest.... The rates
of interest would vary, ,and from loans examined by
the committee, it was noted that the interest ranged
from a low of 15 percent to as high as 198 percent."
Senate Select Comm., FINAL REPORT, part 4, op. cit.
supra note 6, at 772.
29A short account of the conduct of shylocking
operations in Chicago by organization leaders and their
associates is contained in PETERSON, A REPORT ON
CHICAGO CR=M FOR 1961, at 37-38 (1962).
30 "Infiltration of legitimate business by known
hoodlums has progressed to an alarming extent in the
United States. The Committee uncovered several
hundred instances where known hoodlums, many of
them employing the 'muscle' methods of their trade,
had infiltrated more than seventy types of legitimate
business." KEFAuvER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 16. For
a discussion of the extent and pattern of organized
crime's infiltration of legitimate business, see Special
Senate Comm., Tmn= INTERi. REPORT, op cit. supra
note 6, at 17-81.
31 "The early experience with pinball and slot
machine gambling, derived by the underworld through
its infiltration in this field, has enabled criminals to
extend their operations into non-gambling amusement
games, automatic phonographs and, to a minor extent,
in vending machines. They have obtained such holdings
by investing money received from illicit enterprises;
and by force, terror and the corruption of management,
union and public officials. Experience has shown that
where they have such interest they seek to dominate
the field, and have attained a great measure of success
in urban centers of New York, New Jersey, Illinois,
Louisiana, Ohio, Michigan, Florida, and Indiana."
Senate Select Comm., FINAL REPORT, Part 4, op. cit.
supra note 6, at 856.
An extensive survey of the infiltration of organized
crime into this industry is contained in the above-cited
report of the McClellan committee at pages 733-867.
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and beer distribution, nightdubs,34 food whole-
saling, 5 record manufacturing,38 the garment in-
dustry- and a host of other legitimate lines of
See also, PETERSON, A REPORT ON CHICAGO CRIME
FOR 1954, at 19-20 (1955).
* Some examples of infiltration by organized crime
into this industry were cited in the reports of the
Kefauver Committee, as follows:
"The phenomenon of Willie Moretti, one of Costello's
associates, in making a success of a large linen-supply
company because 'he knew a lot of people' and 'got
plenty of business in a polite way' (which his competi-
tors found not so polite) is one of the darker chapters
of American business.
"In Detroit, Louis Riccardi, an associate of such
Detroit hoodlums as Angelo Meli, and who was arrested
five times for murder, operates a very profitable
laundry-the Clean Linen Service Co. Riccardi made
$56,000 out of this business in 1949. It is alleged that
customers who drop his service may find that no other
laundry will dare to accept their business.
"Moe Dalitz and other members of the Cleveland
gang operate laundries in both Cleveland and Detroit."
Special Senate Comm., THIRn INTERIM REPORT, op.
cit. supra note 6, at 179-80.
3 The most dramatic and well publicized venture of
organized crime into this field was Tony Accardo's
service as a "beer salesman" for a beer distributing
firm, which service gave rise to his conviction, later
reversed, for income tax evasion. "It was also in 1956
that Capone gang boss, Tony Accardo, was placed on
the payroll of Premium Beer Sales, Inc., at a salary of
$65,000 a year. Subsequently, whenever. . . distribu-
tors wanted Fox Head Beer they found it necessary
to make the deal with Premium. Following the revela-
tions in 1959 of Accardo's connection with Premium
Beer Sales, Inc., the Fox Head Brewing Company
revoked Premium's exclusive distributorship." PETER-
SON, A REPORT ON CHICAGO CRT TOR 1959, at 29
(1960). Nor has the Accardo prosecution halted racke-
teer infiltration of this industry.
"In 1961 Tony Accardo's associate, Dominick Volpe,
applied for a basic federal permit for his new venture
called the Seaway Beverages, Inc., located at 2555
Armitage Avenue in Cicero. His new company occupies
the same quarters as the defunct Premium Beer Sales,
Inc ... ." PETERSON, A REPORT ON CHICAGO CRIME
FOR 1961, at 47 (1962).
Chicago is by no means the only metropolitan center
in which criminal organizations have assumed a leading
role in the distribution of beer and liquor. The Kefauver
Committee uncovered many other instances:
"In Kansas City, the committee found such notorious
hoodlums as Joe and Vincent di Giovanni holding
exclusive franchises for several leading brands of whisky
including Schenley's and Seagrams.
"In New Jersey, Joseph Reinfeld, a leading liquor
distributor, and Abner (Longie) Zwillman owned
substantial stock.., in the whisky distilling firm of
Browne-Vintners Corp....
"In Tampa, the committee found a Mafia hoodlum,
Salvatore 'Red' Italiano, to be the general manager of
a wine and beer distributing business. The committee
also found a man with a narcotics distributing record,
Louis Swed, to be the principal distributor of Budweiser
beer in Florida. In Des Moines, Iowa, Lew Farrell, an
alleged Capone syndicate hoodlum with a considerable
criminal record who allegedly controlled the race wire
in that city,.. . distributes Blatz and Prima-Bismarck
beer....
endeavor have been invaded by organized crime.H
When it enters one of these areas, a criminal or-
ganization uses force and fear,39 to attempt to
"The fact that the committee has mentioned the
names of certain leading distillers and brewers should
not be construed to mean that they have been the only
or even the worst offenders. Practically every large
distillery and brewery, has granted franchises to racke-
teer dealers." Special Senate Comm., THIR INTERIM:
REPORT, op. cit. supra note 6, at 172-74.
4 In 1951, the Kefauver Committee could report
that "among the leading hoodlums in the restaurant,
night club, bar, and tavern businesses, are Frank
Costello, Phil Kastel, Charles Fischetti, Carolos Mar-
cello, Mushy Wexler, Harry Russell, and Mike Lascari."
Special Senate Comm., THIRD INTERm REPORT, op.
cit. supra note 6, at 180. This list represents organiza-
tion leaders from Chicago, New York, New Orleans
and many other leading cities.
' "The connection of powerful Capone gangsters
with the food industry in Chicago received attention
when Dr. Herman N. Bundeson, President of the Board
of Health, revealed that based on violation of sanitary
laws and operation without a proper license, he had
closed the Twin Food Products Company plant at 3250
Wentworth Avenue for a month ending September 18,
1959. Holding financial interests in the company were
Philip (Milwaukee Phil) Alderisio and Albert (Obie)
Frabotta, and salesmen for the firm included Sam
(Teetz) Battaglia and Marshall Caifano. All four men
were important Capone gang henchmen." PETERSON,
A REPORT ON CHICAGO CRIm TOR 1959, at 36 (1960).
That racketeer infiltration into the food industry is
neither confined to the Chicago area nor merely a recent
development is attested to by the findings of the Ke-
fauver Committee in 1951. "The Committee found
numerous hoodlums engaged in the distribution of food
products, including Big Bill Tocco, Joe Massei of
Detroit, Carlos Marcello of New Orleans, Paul Di-
Giovanni, Emilio Georgetti in California and many
others. The committee found evidence of muscle
tactics in connection with the baking business in
Kansas City, where a hoodlum-dominated bakery
owned by the late Charlie Binaggio, Joe Cusumano,
and Joe Filardo was muscling in on legitimate bakeries.
The committee also found a number of hoodlums
engaged in the olive oil, cheese, and other food-im-
porting businesses, including Joe Profaci of New York,
Anthony Milano in Detroit, and Jack Dragna on the
west coast." Special Senate Comm., THIn INTERIM
REPORT, op. cit. supra note 6, at 181.
IS "In late 1956, Chicago jukebox operators received
written, telephoned, and personal solicitations from
Smith (jukebox racketeer), his brother, Frank, and
from Glimco (labor racketeer) to purchase their
supplies of records at Lormar Distributing Co....
"This is a syndicate operation, the Lormar Record
Co., an underworld's operation, and Mr. English (the
owner of record) in our estimation is merely a front.
He is a lieutenant of Sam "Mooney" Giancana, who
along with Tony Accardo, is probably now one of the
chief underworld figures in the Chicago area ... "
Senate Select Comm., FINAL REPORT, op. cit. supra
note 6, at 775-76.
A subsequent simultaneous raid of Lormar and a
manufacturing firm in Cincinnati revealed that the
two firms were in the business of manufacturing and
distributing counterfeit records. Id. at 778-79. A trade
paper reports that counterfeiting of name-brand records
is a burgeoning industry:
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secure a monopoly as to that service or product
in the metropolitan area where the particular
organization is located. 0 When the campaign to
monopolize is successful, the criminal organization
begins to extract a premium price from the cus-
"Bootlegging of single records.., is blossoming in
greater abundance than ever....
"Most recently afflicted area appears to be New
York but tradesters are openly connecting bootlegging
operations with the vast amount of transshipped
merchandise noted as flowing between many cities....
What has tradesters badly shaken up now is the fact
that the proportion of bootlegged disks now being sold
as legit, seems to be increasing steadily." The Billboard,
Nov. 9, 1959, quoted in Senate Select Comm., FINAL
REPORT, op. cit. supra note 6, at 780.
m"This industry has attracted some of the top
gangsters in the country. Harry Stromberg, alias Nig.
Rosen, a tough Philadelphia criminal, was a partner in
the Dearest Miss Dress Co., in New York City....
"Irving Sherman, the gambler associate of both
Costello and Mayor O'Dwyer, is a partner in Courtshire
Fashions which manufactures ladies' coats and suits.
"Albert Anastasia, one of New York's major crimi-
nals, has a dress business in Hazelton, Pa. Thomas
Luchese, whom the Narcotics Bureau states to be
associated with an important narcotics ring in New
York,... is an officer in a ladies coat manufacturing
concern. Frank Livorsi, whose criminal record includes
a narcotics conviction and numerous arrests, and who
was involved in a big black-market sugar operation
during World War II, was in a dress concern with Max
Edler, who also had a narcotics record." Special Senate
Comm., THIRD INTERim REPORT, op. cit. supra note 6,
at 178-79. For an account of this aspect of organized.
criminal activity, see Velie, Gangsters in the Dres
Business, Reader's Digest, July, 1955.
Is The Kefauver committee found evidence of racke-
teer infiltration in no less than 50 separate sectors of
legitimate business activity in 19S1. These ranged from
advertising to transportation. Special Senate Comm.,
THIRD INTERnS REPORT, op. cit. supra note 6, at 171.
A study undertaken by the McClellan Committee into
the criminal backgrounds and legitimate holdings of
the participants in the Apalachin conference produced
the following enlightening outline of criminal power in
legitimate commerce:
"There were 58 known hoodlums in attendance at
the appalachian meeting, ... [O]f the 58, 50 had arrest
records; 35 records of convictions, and 23" had spent
time in prisons or jails as a result of these convictions;
18 of these men had been either arrested or questioned
at one time in connection with murder cases. Other
illegal activity noted in the survey included narcotics
(for which 15 had been arrested or convicted); gam-
bling (for which 30 had been arrested or convicted);
and the illegal use of firearms (for which 23 had been
arrested or convicted).
"As to legitimate business activities, a study of the
men who attended the Appalachian meeting showed: 9
were or had been in the coin-operated machine business;
16 were involved in garment manufacturing or trucking;
10 owned grocery stores or markets; 17 owned taverns
or restaurants; 11 were in the olive oil-cheese importing
or exporting business; 9 were in the construction busi-
ness. Others were involved in automotive agencies, coal
companies, entertainment, funeral homes, ownership of
horses and racetracks, linen and laundry enterprises,
trucking, waterfront activities and bakeries, and one
was a conductor of a dance band." Senate Select
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tomers of the product or service and thereby
achieves its accustomed extraordinary rate of
return. Thus, millions are channeled into the
organization treasury and diverted from law
abiding businessmen who conduct their businesses
in an ethical manner.'
Comm., FINAL REPORT, op. cit. supra note 6, at 487-88.
Also revealing are thumbnail sketches of the legitimate
interests held by 31 of the persons in attendance at the
Apalachin conference contained in SoNDEN, op. cit.
supra note 7, at 209-10.
31 "These individuals, frequently using their criminal
organizations, have engaged in various legitimate
enterprises; in these legitimate enterprises they often
use the same tactics of intimidation and monopolization
which characterize their criminal activities." Special
Senate Comm., FIRST INTERim REPORT, op. cit. supra
note 6, at 2. A good example of the resort to violence
and intimidation as a competitive technique in legiti-
mate commerce is provided by a recent campaign in
the Chicago area to obtain locations for organization
jukeboxes and pinball machines.
"Of particular interest to the State's Attorney's
office was the evidence of violence which had terrorized
Chicago coin amusement machine operators for several
months. Two Chicago ex-convicts, Alex Ross,... and
James Rini, . . . had brought coin machine operators
and tavern owners in line through attacks with guns,
axes and acid. It was alleged that these two men dis-
tributed business cards of Thomas (Red) Waterfall,
executive director of the Chicago Independent Amuse-
ment Association, before they resorted to their terror-
istic tactics." PETERSON, A REPORT ON CHICAGO
CRIME for 1954, at 53 (1955).
40 "Organized criminals are active in a great many
different fields. Furthermore, the profits derived from
these different activities and their consequent relative
importance is constantly changing.... The under-
lying motive, however, never varies. It is always to
secure and hold a monopoly in some activity which
will produce large profits." Olney, supra note 16, at
272.
41 The benefits accruing to a criminal organization
from ownership of legitimate businesses often transcend
the immediate profits earned by the enterprise. "The
Racketeer's choice has been largely in the fields where
the cash turnover is great ... and the problems of
accounting and control are difficult." ABA, REPORT ON
ORGANIZED CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 20 (1952-
53). This enables an organization to disguise the source
and ultimate destination of the ill-gotten gains from its
strictly illegal enterprises such as gambling and nar-
cotics. Moreover, legitimate businesses sometimes
allow organization leaders to account to the Internal
Revenue Service for their luxurious standards of living
without revealing either the source or extent of their
illegitimate income. See Special Senate Comm., THIa
INTERIM REPORT, op. cit. supra note 16, at 170.
Ownership of certain types of legitimate business by
a criminal organization will materially aid the conduct
of its illegitimate endeavors.
"[Ylou use the same kind of service facilities to
maintain various types of gambling equipment that
you use to maintain a perfectly legitimate jukebox or a
perfectly legitimate cigarette vendor, and you use the
same truck, and the same mechanics, and the same
shop facilities."
"Testimony about coin-machine operations in Gary,
Ind., and New Orleans, La., established that industry
EARL JOHNSON, JR.
Combining the income earned by organized
crime from all these sources, one arrives at an un-
certain but staggering sum. It is impossible to
calculate the exact amount of money organized
crime removes from the economy each year. But
it can probably be safely stated that it is more than
the earnings of any single legitimate corporation,
including General Motors. In fact, it may exceed
that of any single industry including the huge
automobile and steel industries.4
B. The Suffocation of Free Competition
With its extensive infiltration of legitimate
business, organized crime now inflicts a new injury
and poses a new threat to the American economy.
The proper functioning of a free economy requires
that economic decisions be made by persons free to
exercise their own judgment. Quality and price
must be the determinative factors in the market
place. The only limitations up6n entry of a given
product or a given supplier to the market should
be those imposed by the impersonal forces of supply
and demand. In most areas of the economy, any
artificial influence which exerts pressures on the
economic decisi6n-making units of the economy
participation gave to criminals the opportunity to
obtain licenses for short-wave radio stations allegedly
to dispatch vehicles servicing coin machines, but
actually to disseminate racetrack results in further-
ance of illegal bookmaking activities."
"T]Mrucking operations in some instances give gang-
sters access to the waterfront, where they can facilitate
smuggling of narcotics. The importation of narcotics is
also sometimes covered through import-export busi-
nesses ... [Niarcotics are sometimes sealed in barrels
of olive oil or in the heart of huge cheeses. . . [A]cetic
anhydride, which is used by garment manufacturers in
connection with the treatment of rayon, can also be
used to convert raw opium into a morphine base from
which it can be made into heroin." Senate Select
Comm., FINAL REPORT, op. cit. supra note 6, at 742, 743,
498-99. It is interesting to note that of the participants
in the Apalachin meeting, 11 were in the olive oil-cheese
import-export business, an ideal cover for the importa-
tion of narcotics from the Mediterranean area. Id. at
487-88.
42 Elmo Roper, the pollster, who confined his com-
parison to the revenues from commercial gambling,
has drawn the conclusion that "only the food, steel,
auto, chemical, and machine-tool industries have a
greater volume of business." BEL, op. cil. supra note
11, at 133. Combining with the total from illegal
gambling, the millions from narcotics, the billion from
labor-management racketeering, and additional billions
from "shylocking," legitimate businesses, and other
sources it is highly probable that the gross revenues
accruing to organized crime surpass most if not all of
these gigantic industries. And since the rate of profit
enjoyed by organized crime exceeds by several times
the normal rates in legitimate industry, it is virtually
inevitable that organized crime reaps a higher total of
net income than any single industry.
will tend to limit choices, reduce quality, and
increase prices. When organized crime embarks
on a venture in legitimate business it ordinarily
brings to that venture all the techniques of violence
and intimidation which are employed in its illegal
enterprises. 43 Competitors are pressured into shift-
ing to other lines of business or ceasing operations
altogether." Customers are induced to confine
3 "A gangster or racketeer in a legitimate business
does not suddenly become respectable. The methods
which he used to achieve success in racketeering and
gambling enterprises are not easily sloughed off. Thus,
evidence was produced before the committee concerning
the use of unscrupulous and discriminatory business
practices, extortion, bombing, and other forms of
violence to eliminate competitors and to compel
customers to take articles sold by the mobsters....
This gives him a considerable advantage over a more
timid competitor and is one of the means whereby
the racketeer can push a competitor to the wall."
Special Senate Comm., T=mn INTERim REPoRT, op. cit.
supra note 6, at 170.
4 From two coin machine distributors who had the
courage to report to the authorities attempts to muscle
in on their businesses, the McClellan committee heard
dramatic accounts of the techniques employed by a
criminal organization against existing concerns in an
industry it desires to invade. Mr. Sidney Saul, of
Brooklyn, New York, related that strongarm men had
advised him to take in the organization as a partner or
"they would find my body off the Belt Parkway."
When the threat of death did not yield rapid results,
Saul was administered a beating which left him unable
to chew food for almost three weeks. At the time of the
hearings, he was under continuous police protection.
Senate Select Comm., FINAL REPORT, op. cit. supra
note 6, at 756-63.
Similar threats were delivered to Bernard Poss of
Aurora, Illinois, by Rocco Prano, an underling of Sam
"Mooney" Giancana, who is one of the highest placed
members in the Chicago criminal organization. When
threats of physical harm to Poss failed to budge him,
the organization shifted to another technique.
"I continued to run my business, and then one night
I got a telephone call that two men had entered one of
my locations, one with an ax and one with a gun....
[T]he man with the gun said, 'Everybody stay where
you are and you won't get hurt.'... He went with an
ax and he chopped up the pinball machine and he
chopped up the pool table. ... Then a little later I got
another telephone call from another location. They had
done the same thing .... A little while later I got a call
from another one. They chopped up another one.
"Well, with that I pulled down my equipment and
went out of that business, just pulled them into the
office. We didn't sell out or let anybody else have
them. We just pulled them in. I turned around and
sold the machines." Id. at 785-87.
From the testimony of those few who have had the
courage to resist the pressures exerted by organized
crime, a picture can be drawn of the threats and vio-
lence which are the backbone of every campaign to
monopolize a legitimate industry. The result in most
industries is typified by the reaction of legitimate
operators in the coin machine industry.
"In many of the metropolitan areas, reputable
businessmen who have been in the industry for many
many years are just throwing up their hands and getting
out, because they cannot do business on the terms they
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their purchases to the organization owned or
sponsored suppliers.45 Thus, every natural eco-
nomic impulse is repressed, and the market is
regimented to serve the purposes of organized
crime rather than to benefit the consuming public.
Monopoly, great or small, nation-wide or city-
wide, is the deadly enemy of free enterprise.
Organized crime, as one of the most active
monopolizers46 in the American economy, is an
unwelcome trespasser on the preserve of legiti-
mate business enterprise. Its effect is even more
unwholesome than other monopolies because its
monopoly position will not rest upon any demon-
strated superiority as an economic unit, but upon
its expertise in physical violence. Where other
enterprises overcome competitors by underselling
them, a criminal organization eliminates them by
imposing a reign of terror. As a result, the American
economy can suffer additional loss as efficient
producers and distributors are driven out not by
more efficient monopolies but by less efficient ones,
merely because the latter are backed by a criminal
organization. a
Thus far, criminal organizations have managed
to substitute their own peculiar form of regulated
economy for free competition in a variety of in-
dustries.4 On the whole, organized crime has been
able to achieve a stranglehold over any given
have to to compete with people who have hoodlum
connections." Id. at 741.
41 "In Kansas City, Wolf Riman, before his murder,
successfully pressured tavern owners into using his
juke-box machines...." Special Senate Comm., TgHrD
INTERM REPORT, op. cit. supra note 6, at 179.
In the case of customers, more subtle measures
short of violence ordinarily suffice to induce a shift
from a legitimate supplier to an organization supplier.
The threat of picketing by a captive union or the with-
drawal of some essential service already monopolized by
a criminal organization will be highly persuasive to a
consumer who has much less at stake than Ithe organi-
zation's competitors. These techniques are described in
Senate Select Comm., FiNAL REPORT, op. cit. supra
note 6, at 736-37, 824.
", "Monopoly is the key to big money in criminal
activity. It is also sought by mobsters when they enter
legitimate business." Special Senate Comm., TH=
IN-Ernp! REPORT, op. cit. supra note 6, at 170.
47 "There can be little doubt that the public suffers
from gangster penetration into legitimate business. It
suffers because higher prices must be paid for articles
and services which it must buy.... The public suffers
because it may have to put up with shoddy and inferior
merchandise in fields where gangsters have been able
to obtain a monopoly. One such olive-oil dealer, Joseph
Profaci, was cited for a series of violations of the pure
food and drug laws including one for which he was
fined $12,000." Senate Special Comm., Tmiz INTERim
REPORT, op. cit. supra note 6, at 171.
11 See notes 31 to 38 supra and accompanying test.
product on a metropolitan basis, but not through-
out the nation. These local monopolies have a
severe enough impact on the economy. However,
the dominance of criminal organizations in some
industries, such as the distribution of juke boxes,
has become so prevalent in virtually all metro-
politan areas as to amount to a nation-wide mo-
nopoly.49 The power of organized crime and its
pernicious influence over both local and national
markets already has attained dangerous propor-
tions. And its power and influence are increasing.
Each year finds new industries and new markets
transformed from a free. competitive basis to the
control of monopolies owned or sponsored by
organized crime.
C. The Infliction of Physical .ijury and Death
The foregoing represents merely the economic
cost of organized crime. What of the human cost-
the broken bones, the acid-scarred faces, the nerve-
shattering fear, the bullet-riddled bodies-which
the terror tactics of organized crime add to the
total bill? Although the frequency of out-right
gangland killings has diminished considerably from
the strong-arm heyday of Al Capone, organized
crime is still responsible for a much larger propor-
tion of murders than any other element of equal
size in our society.5 0 While as many as 70 gangland
killings occurred annually in Chicago during the
1920's,51 the decrease to fifteen in 19612 does not
Al "One of the very significant characteristics of the
entire (jukebox) industry is the permeation of racket
figures in it. No matter where you go, you are almost
certain to find that leading operators in various areas
are hoodlums, and they are people with racket con-
nections and they are people with police records."
Senate Select Comm., FINAL REPORT, op. cit. supra
note 6, at 741.
10 It is not only the number of murders caused by
organized crime gangland killings which makes them
of special concern to the nation; it is also the fact that
they are murders committed with impunity.
"Of the 296 murder offenses reported in 1957 to the
Chicago police, 260, or 87.8 percent, were cleared by
arrest. Nationally, about nine out of ten murders are
solved through arrest. The average murder case presents
few problems to the police and is readily solved. Un-
fortunately, this picture changes sharply, however,
when considering murders committed by... pro-
fessional killers. Such cases present the police with few
tangible clues and too frequently remain unsolved."
PETERSON, A REPORT ON CHICAGO CRIME FOR 1957,
at 3 (1958).
"[Tihroughout the thirty-nine year period from 1919
through 1957, only 17 persons have been convicted in
connection with 926 gang murders committed. Hence,
for every hundred ging killings, an average of only 1.8
persons were convicted." Id. at 28.
r' bid. The report lists 76 gang killings for the
single year 1926.
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exactly warrant the presentation of good conduct
medals to the organization overlords. The diminish-
ing murder statistic does not herald a purge of the
instinct for violence from the nature of organized
crime. It is attributable principally to a decline in
inter-gang warfare and the consolidation of crimi-
nal power in the hands of a few large cooperating
criminal organizations. A secondary and lesser
factor contributing to the diminished incidence of
murder is the persuasive influence of the reputa-
tion for violence which organized crime carries
with it. The whispered name of a gangster chief-
tain often will instill as much fear in the hearer as
brandishing a loaded revolver in his face. 4
Despite the apparent statistical trend toward
less violent business techniques, organized crime
probably represents at least as large a threat as it
formerly did to the lives and health of persons
outside the underworld. Where most of the victims
of gangland bullets in the 1920's and 1930's were
members of rival gangs, most of the current vic-
tims are potential witnesses against the organiza-
tion,55 threatened businessmen and labor leaders
S2 PETERSON, A REPORT ON CHICAGO CRIME FOR
1961, at 27 (1962). Incidentally, this is the highest total
of gangland killings recorded in Chicago since 1935.
Ibid.
3 "As the years went by and the mobsters grew
suaver and more experienced they realized that killings
were not only bad business but bad public relations,
that 'in union there is strength.' Gradually they got
together, they toned down on the violence and...
began reaching more or less peaceful agreements on
divisions of territory and 'spheres of influence.' "
KEFAUVER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 12, 13.
- This factor is illustrated by an exchange between
Chief Counsel Kennedy and Detective Captain Richard
Hackmeyer of the St. Louis Police Department during
the McClellan committee hearings.
"MR. KENNEDY. It would not be necessary, really, to
use violence to a location owner in the St. Louis area,
if you told him that either John Vitale or Buster
Wortman were behind the operation.
"CAPTAIN HACKIMEYER. The reputation, sir, carries
great weight, and is hardly necessary to even indicate
any muscle....
"To give you an idea of the reputation founded or
unfounded, one location owner, when I asked him why
he didn't change since he complained about the reputa-
tion of these people in there, and he felt he was being
shorted on his cut from the cigarette machine, he said,
'You fight the Mafia, not me'.. .." Senate Select
Comm., FINAL REPORT, op. cit. supra note 6, at 738.
55 A few examples gleaned from crime commission
reports and committee hearings of witnesses, police,
and informers struck down in gangland fashion include:
"Vito Genovese, Mike Miranda, Gus Frasca, and
George Smurra were all indicted for ... murder....
Before hetrould be arrested on the indictment, Genovese
disappeared and later turned up in Italy.... While in
Italy, one of the key witnesses... was murdered; a
second died under the most mysterious circumstances
who refuse to quake, 5 borrowers from loan shark
(poisoning while in jail)." Senate Select Comm., FNAI
REPORT, op. cit. supra note 6, at 500.
"Carl Carramusa, who testified for the Government
in [a] Kansas City narcotics trial, was shot to death 3
years later in Chicago where he had gone to escape
retribution by the Mafia. Thomas Buffa, who testified
for the Government in a collateral matter affecting
the narcotics trial, fled to California after an attempt
had been made on his life, but was shot to death in
California in 1946." Special Senate Comm., THIR
INTERiM REPORT, op. cit. supra note 6, at 38.
"Evidence of obstruction of justice by violence was
found in the shocking shotgun murder of Attorney Sam
Rummel. His voice was forever silenced on December
11, 1950, the day following a conference with Sheriff's
officers Guasti and Pearson....
"In another case, law-enforcement officers found
their path to conviction for narcotic violations of the
notorious Sica Brothers blocked by the gang murder of
Abraham Davidian, the man considered by the prosecu-
tion to be the key witness and 'sine qua non' to con-
iction." Special Senate Comm., THn INTERIM
REPORT, op. cit. supra note 6, at 96.
"On March 28, 1960, the nude body of forty-two-
year-old Arthur Adler... was found stuffed in a
sewer ... in Chicago .... In October, 1959, Adler had
been called to testify before a special federal grand
jury that was investigating alleged connections of the
Capone syndicate with Chicago's night club business.
Several months earlier Joseph Bronge, a Melrose Park,
Illinois, beer distributor, who had appeared before the
same grand jury, was shot and killed in typical gangland
fashion.
"On February 9, 1960, Herman Posner, a seventy-
two-year-old moving picture projectionist, was killed
... just a few hours before Posner was scheduled to
turn over to the Federal Government evidence of
gangland racketeering in Local 110 of the Chicago
Moving Picture Operators Union." PETERSON, A
REPORT ON CHICAGO CRIM roR 1960, at 53-54 (1961).
"On November 16, 1961, forty-three-year-old John
Hennigan was shotgunned to death across the street
from his home.... It was reported that Hennigan had
served as an informer for the State's Attorney's office."
PETERSON, A REPORT ON CHICAGO CRM FOR 1961,
at 36 (1962).
56 Examples of killings involving this class of victim
include the following from the bloody annals of recent
Chicago crime.
"[I]n 1956... Capone gang boss, Tony Accardo, was
placed on the payroll of Premium Beer Sales, Inc., at
a salary of S65,000 a year. Subsequently whenever
Bronge or other distributors wanted Fox Head Beer
they found it necessary to make the deal with Premium.
"On Sunday, July, 1959, as Joseph Bronge left his
distributing firm's offices... he was confronted by two
gunmen who opened fire on him. He remained in
critical condition until he died on November 6, 1959."
PETERSON, A REPORT ON CHICAGO CRaIE FOP 1959, at
29 (1960).
"On September 4, 1957, the bullet riddled body of
James DeRosa, a pinball machine operator in downstate
Illinois, was found on a farm near Springfield, Illinois."
PETERSON, A REPORT ON CHICAGO CRIME FOR 1957, at
23 (1958).
"Perhaps the fnost significant gangland type killing
of the year (1961) occurred... when fifty-five year old
John A. Kilpatrick, international president of the
United Industrial Workers of America, was found shot
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enterprises who fail to repay their loans,n or per-
sons on the fringe of orgafiized crime who in one
way or another had a falling out with the organiza-
tion leadership. The destructive energies of or-
ganized crime are no longer dissipated on internal
strife; they are concentrated on its outside
enemies.'8 Moreover, there is no evidence that the
decrease in the number of murders has been ac-
companied by a diminished propensity to commit
lesser forms of mayhem. A battered, bruised and
frightened adversary is usually as good as a dead
one. He will not squeal, he will not oppose; he
will obey. Consequently, organized crime is ordi-
narily satisfied to maim instead of murder.
to death in his car .... Kilpatrick had engaged in court
battles against Capone syndicate hoodlum Angelo
Inciso who was president of Amalgamated Local 286,
United Industrial Workers of America." P ansoN, A
REPORT ON CMCAGO CRME FoR 1961,, at 32 (1962).
5 This is becoming a more frequent motive for
gangland killing because of the rapid growth of or-
ganized crime's interest in "shylocking." This trend is
evidenced by the pattern of these murders reported in
Chicago for the year 1961.
"[O]n March 31, 1961, thirty-eight year old John
Arthur Powers was about to enter his basement apart-
ment.., when he was ambushed by gunmen, shot
five times and killed.... Shortly before his death he
had confided to friends that he owed $1,800 to the
"Outfit," a name frequently applied to the syndicate."
PETERsON, A REPORT ON CHICAGO CR"ME rOR 1961, at
27 (1962).
"On June 13, 1961, the body of thirty-nine year old
L. C. Smith, a Negro,... was found in his parked
car.... [Tlhere were reports that the slaying may have
stemmed from underworld loan sharks known as
'juice men' who loan money ... at usurious interest
rates." Id. at 28-29.
"On June 20, 1961, the battered body of fifty-seven
year old Ralph Del Genio was found by police in an
automobile....
"According to a relative, Del Genio had gambled
heavily in Cicero gambling joints and was deeply in
debt to crime syndicate loan sharks. . . ." Id. at 30.
'8This shift in emphasis is evident from the compo-
sition of gangland murders attributable to professional
killers in Chicago during 1961. As the Chicago Crime
Commission reports:
"... Although only one of the fifteen gangland type
killings in the Chicago area in 1962 was solved, an
analysis of available information reveals certain
significant facts....
"Two victims had connections with the narcotics
racket, one as an addict and the other as a big dope
peddler as well as a gambling house proprietor. At
least five of the victims, and possible others, had either
been dealing with syndicate 'loan sharks,' known as
'juice men,' or were making collections for them. Two
of the victims had allegedly served as informers, while
another had been responsible for bringing his girl
friend to gatherings of mobsters after which she fur-
nished information to officials. At least two victims were
connected with the cigarette vending machine business.
The gang killing in 1961 which is considered solved,
definitely stemmed from the victim's fight against a
syndicate labor racketeer." Id. at 36.
Nor is the physical toll taken by organized crime
confined to the shootings and beatings deliberately
administered by hired strong-arm specialists.
Hundreds of deaths and thousands of illnesses are
traceable to the narcotics which criminal organiza-
tions distribute. 59
D. Deliberate Rxpansiow of Vice
Organized crime is never satisfied to minister to
existing levels of human weakness in the areas of
gambling, commercial sex, and narcotics. An or-
ganization has an economic stake in expanding the
market for its illegal products. Often men are
employed to "steer" potential customers to gam-
bling casinos and prostitutes. A frequent procedure
is for one of these men to mix with conventioneers,
buy them a few drinks, and entice them into ac-
companying him to "a better place." The "better
place" invariably is a gambling casino or house of
prostitution from which the conventioneers will
emerge not better but poorer. Thus, people who
had no inclination before the evening began of
indulging in either of these activities are inveigled
into participation by the deliberate efforts of sales-
men for the organization's "products." And this
pattern and purpose are repeated in myriad forms
in its promotional campaign for these products.
However, nothing in the areas of gambling or
prostitution approximates the ruthless methods
employed to develop the drug market. 60 It is not
merely coincidental that the men who retail illicit
narcotics are called dope pushers. Here the effort is
concentrated on "hooking" the most susceptible
and unsophisticated element of our population-
teenagers.61 Many lifelong addicts can trace their
,9 The death toll from narcotics in New York City
alone during the period 1946-1954 has been reported
by the Chief Medical Examiner of that city as follows:
1946-11 deaths 1951-77 deaths
1947-19 deaths 1952-122 deaths
1948-17 deaths 1953-100 deaths
1949-32 deaths 1954-102 deaths
1950-56 deaths
Hearings Before Ike Subcommittee on Improvements in
the Federal Criminal Code, supra note 6, at 1910.
The physical toll which narcotic drugs exact from
living addicts is detailed in a Philadelphia Police
Department pamphlet reprinted in the Daniels Com-
mittee hearings. See id. at 601-603.
60 "From the available information it appears that
the narcotics traffic in this country after a slow but
steady decline for a generation has recently shown a
sharp upsurge." Special Senate Comm., Tamn INTERim
REPORT, op. cit. supra note 6, at 168.
61 "A most disquieting feature is that in several
localities, principally in large cities, a substantial
proportion of the new addicts are young people, persons
in their late 'teens and early 20's. At the present time
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lifelong miseries to a free marihuana cigarette
offered by a "friendly stranger"62 and puffed sur-
repticiously in the schoolyard before class or
during recess.6
As the result of organized crime's self-serving and
cruel exploitation of its illegal markets, to the
extent it is successful, America is destined to have
an ever-increasing population of narcotics addicts,
habitual gamblers, and devotees of commercialized
sex. Organized crime should never be allowed the
moral defense that its illegal activities merely fill
the natural and unnatural existing needs of certain
members of the populace, because organized crime
consciously and systematically strives to sow and
cultivate these needs.
E. The Encouragement of Derivative Criminal
Conduct Among Other Persons
Many of the illegal products and services mar-
keted by organized crime carry with them a dan-
gerous by-product of crime. This is over and above
the crimes committed by the criminal organization
itself in distributing the forbidden commodity.
Rather, these are the crimes which the consumers-
or probably more accurately the victims-of these
products and services commit.
For example, patrons of organized crime's largest
selling service, gambling, sometimes are forced by
this phase of the narcotic problem is a matter of acute
public interest and widespread alarm." Special Senate
Comm., TmRD INTERim REPORT, op. cit. supra note 6,
at 165.
12 "Against this backdrop of tragedy, the picture of
the dope peddler promoting drug addiction in order to
create new customers is nothing short of revolting....
"The professional non-addict peddlers told of giving
'for free' enough heroin to get new customers 'hooked',
i.e., dependent on drugs; and of employing addicts as
'testers' to judge the quality of the merchandise at the
wholesale level." Special Senate Comm., FINAL REPORT,
op. cit. supra note 6, at 24.
"The United States Public Health Service Hospital
at Lexington, Ky.,. . . compared the year 1946 when
patients below the age of 21 represented 3 percent of
the patients in the hospital, with the early part of 1951
when, with a higher total patient count, the proportion
of young patients had climbed to 18 percent." Id. at 27.
"A boy of 19, of a decent family, was snared by a
pusher who gave him a trial capsule of heroin free and
taught him how to use it. Within a few weeks the boy
was a confirmed addict, his craving for the drug
rapidly increasing.... Many thousands of such cases go
into police department files all over the country every
year. Details vary, but the fundamental pattern of the
addict's creation and subsequent behavior is almost
always the same." SONDE RN, op. cit. supra note 7, at
72-73. Case histories of the cultivation of addicts form
a large portion of the testimony recorded before the
Daniels Committee investigation into the narcotics
traffic. See Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Im-
provements in the Federal Criminal Code, supra, note 6.
Lady Luck to engage in secondary criminal con-
duct. In order to recoup heavy losses sustained in
a gambling casino, and to play again, patrons
often resort to larceny, embezzlement, or similar
crimes. In fact, gambling has been cited as the
leading cause of embezzlement.6 However, the
volume of secondary crime triggered by gambling
does not appear to approach the magnitude which
the narcotics traffic sponsors. It has been estimated
that no less than half of the crimes committed in
our largest metropolitan areas are attributable
directly to narcotics.' 5 These crimes range the
full gamut from larceny and robbery to rape and
murder. 66 Some are committed under the influence
of narcotics; others are committed by addicts in
order to obtain the funds necessary to maintain
their expensive habit 7 Whichever the causal link,
64 "Surety companies throughout the United States
list gambling as the principal cause of their large losses
arising out of embezzlement cases." PETERsON, GAxM-
BLING-SHoULD IT BE LEGALIZED? 121 (1951). See,
Peterson, Why Honest People Steal, 38 J. Cans. L. & C.
94 (1947). Peterson cites two examples of embezzlement
by bank tellers in Chicago in the space of two weeks as
"illustrative of thousands of cases where the gambling
mania has led respectable citizens into crime and
disgrace."
"Even trusted employees with long records of service,
who have suddenly become addicted to gambling, step
out of character completely by committing a holdup or
a burglary to stave off financial despair or disgrace.
... On August 9, 1949, a highly respected teller of a
Chicago suburb bank confessed that he had embezzled
$43,543 from his employer during the preceding 18
months to gamble on the horse races .... And hardly
had the prison doors closed on this man before a teller
of a south side Chicago bank confessed to the embezzle-
ment of over $2,000 which he had squandered in
neighborhood handbooks." Ibid.
65 Estimates given to the Daniels Committee con-
cerning the proportion of crime attributable to the
narcotics traffic and drug addiction ranged from 30%
in New York City to 75% in Houston, Texas. Most
averaged around 50%. See, Hearings Before the Sub-
committee on Improvements in the Federal Criminal
Code, supra note 6, at 2393, 2711, 4185, 4200.
66 Since heroin and morphine are depressants rather
than stimulants, most crimes of violence committed
under the influence of drugs have involved marihuana or
cocaine. One such instance was cited to the Daniels
Committee by the Dallas, Texas, Chief of Police.
"A few years ago we had 2 brothers, the Allen
brothers, ... committed a series of robberies, striking
particularly against the operators of liquor stores. They
killed 4 or 5 people. And in their statement to Captain
Fritz after their apprehension they admitted that
before going out on each job, they would smoke a
couple of marihuana cigarettes to put them in the right
frame of mind to commit those crimes." Id. at 2968.
67 "In one city alone, a civic crime-prevention group,
in its study of the narcotics problem, estimated that the
value of property stolen annually to provide the addicts
with funds to buy dope is $60,000,000." Special Senate
Comm., Tssnn I=ma REPORT, op. cit. supra note 6,
at 165.
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organized crime is fully responsible for the resultant
harm to the ultimate victims of these secondary
crimes. For their own profit, criminal organizations
unleash forces which have a predictable and in-
evitable concomitant of extensive and violent
crime. Therefore, the businessman who is robbed
or the teen-age girl who is raped by a narcotics
addict is as much the victim of organized crime as
the addict himself or a person deliberately struck
down by a fusilade from hired gangland killers.
F. The* Corruption of Amateur and Professional
Athletics
Of the billions wagered annually with the gam-
bling outlets of organized crime, the biggest per-
centage is risked on the outcome of various major
athletic events.ns Horseracing, baseball, basket-
ball, football, and boxing are among the sports
which attract bettors by the million and their
dollars by the billion. The operation of the various
betting pools is structured to afford organized
crime a guaranteed proportion of the money
wagered. 69 This profit margin is large; but not
large enough to satiate the greed of many organiza-
tion leaders. An untold and certain additional
profit can be siphoned into an organization's treas-
ury if the outcome of the athletic event is known
to the organization before it occurs. Thus elements
of organized crime constantly engage in efforts to
achieve control over the participants in these con-
tests so that they can determine the winner and
the margin of victory.
In past decades the results of horse races were
often influenced by the administration of drugs
to some of the horses participating in racing
meets." More sophisticated and sustained methods
must be employed to control the performance in
sports such as boxing and baseball which feature
human competitors. The leading performers must
be scouted for those few who will be particularly
susceptible to monetary inducements. A contact is
then made, often through the medium of a present
or former teammate of the subject, one who has
63 It has been estimated that Americans annually bet
six billion dollars on baseball, one billion on football,
one billion on basketball and six billion on horseracing.
BELL, op. cit. supra note 11, at 133.
65 "[Tjhere should be no occasion for cheating in
professional gambling establishments since they
operate on a percentage basis which makes it impossible
for patrons to win in the long run." PETERSON, GAM-
BLING, SHOULD IT BE LEGALIZED? 20 (1951).
70 "There have been times when the practice of
stimulating race horses with drugs has become wide-
spread." Id. at 25.
previously succumbed to the lure of promised
riches. Once hooked, an athlete is led by easy
stages from deliberately poor performances through
"point-shaving" to "throwing a game" or "taking
a fall."n
When a criminal organization succeeds in sub-
verting some key participants in an athletic contest
and thereby is able to determine the outcome, it is
in a position to defraud the other persons who
wager their money on the event. An organization
can make a 100-to-1 underdog a sure victor and
obtain a tremendous return on its own wagers.
The reward to the player for rigging an important
game is normally a few hundred dollars; the reward
to organized crime may be measured in hundreds
of thousands of dollars. The bettors defrauded by
such a scheme will not necessarily be limited to
those who place their wagers with illegal establish-
ments; it may victimize many who patronize only
legitimate outlets such as on-track parimutuel
windows.
It may be difficult to be overly sympathetic
about the plight of defrauded bettors even those
who confine their gambling to legalized establish-
ments. However, the rigging of athletic contests
inflicts a much more grievous injury than monetary
loss on others in society. It destroys the devotion
and eventually the interest of the general public
in the corrupted sport. Rabid, fans evolve into
neutral spectators and ultimately abandon watch-
ing the contests entirely, feeling that they may be
following a mere play contest the outcome of which
has been plotted in advance. Baseball tottered
noticeably on its throne as the national pastime
when Arnold Rothstein, a leading New York
gambler, succeeded in bribing the backbone of the
American League champion Chicago White Sox to
throw the 1919 World Series, giving rise to the
infamous "Blacksox" scandal.72 Professional box-
7 A description of how some athletes have been
corrupted can be found in Cohane, The Gambler's Fix
Menaces Sports, Look Magazine, April 29, 1947.
7 An account of this tragic event is contained in
KATCHER, THE BIG BANKROLL: THE LIFE AND TiMEs
OF AINOLD ROTHSTEIN 139-50 (1959). The effect of
this scandal on professional baseball was summarized by
Virgil Peterson. "The Black Sox scandal in 1919 almost
ruined major league baseball.... Several outstanding
stars were banned from the game for life and organized
baseball appointed a Federal Judge, Kenesaw Mountain
Landis, to act as czar of the game." The shadow of the
scandal lingered over the sport for many decades.
Peterson relates: "At the annual meetings of the
American and National baseball leagues held in Decem-
ber, 1947, much time was devoted to the gambling
problems. The presidents of both leagues indicated that
strong steps would be taken to keep gamblers out of
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ing, once an important spectator sport to millions
of Americans, has deservedly acquired such a
reputation for fixed bouts"1 that it absorbs the
interest of but a small minority of the populace
and is threatened with virtual extinction. Basket-
ball and football have been rocked in recent years
by bribery scandals, at both the college and pro-
fessional levels.74 However, thus far these scandals
have not been so prevalent as to destroy the belief
of the general public in the essential honesty of
most contestants or caused them to doubt that
most football and basketball games are truly con-
tests. But the threat is there, in the form of or-
ganized crime, whose insatiable lust for riches
could push other national sports down the same
road as boxing into oblivion.
G. The Subversion of Democratic Institutions
In order to shield its anti-social activities from
the wrath of an avenging sociefy, organized crime
the ball parks. Just before the opening of the 1947
baseball season the owners of the three New York
baseball clubs made a public statement in which a
warning was issued to gamblers. It was frankly admitted
that baseball could not long survive contamination by
professional gamblers." PETERSON, GAMBLING, SHOULD
IT BE LEGALIZED? 30 (1951).
7"Hearings held in 1960 before the United States
Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly
brought out in bold relief the sinister influence which
Frank Carbo and other underworld characters have
exerted on professional boxing in America....
[Carbo's] performers, or those he controls, continue to
appear in major arenas, and their antics are truly
astonishing, particularly when the betting odds are
'right.' " PETERSON, A REPORT ON CHICAGO CRIME
FOR 1960, at 65 (1961).
14 "During 1945 and 1946 several scandals involving
sports came to light. In December, 1946, an effort
was made to fix the championship professional football
game between the New York Giants and the Chicago
Bears." PETERSON, op. cit. supra note 69, at 30. More
recently, grand juries in New York and North Carolina
returned indictments against several leading figures in
organized crime who had arranged to bribe scores of
college basketball players to fix the outcome of Atlantic
Coast Conference games and other key contests along
the eastern seaboard. The Washington Post, Jan. 10,
1962, at B 10. The Kefauver Committee likewise
alluded to this process. "Brodson [a leading Milwaukee
gambler] explained the 'spread system' of basketball
betting under which it is possible for a bookie to win
both ends of bets on college basketball games if one
team beats another by a score falling within the spread
which may run from 2 to 7 points. Brodson readily
conceded that this practice unquestionably contributed
toward the corruption of college basketball players who
could be talked into controlling the score of a game so
that it ended within the spread and yet won the game
for the school they represented. The transition from
this state of moral destruction in youth to the point
where a player would accept money to throw the game
completely became, thereafter, relatively simple."
Special Senate Comm., THIRD INTERIM REPORT, op.
cit. supra note 6, at 161.
endeavors to capture or at least neutralize those
who are charged with enforcing society's laws 5
At various times criminal organizations have been
a dominant political force in metropolitan centers
such as New York,7s Chicago,7 Miami 8 and New
Orleans. Only fortuitous circumstance thwarted
attempts to completely take over Portland"9 and
Kansas City.80 In addition, many smaller com-
75 "The attempt to paralyze law enforcement by
political means is encountered again and again in the
testimony before the committee." Special Senate
Comm., THIRD INTERIM REPORT, op. cit. supra note 6,
at 185.
76 "Costello reached the height of his power in New
York politics in 1942 when he unquestionably had
complete domination over Tammany Hall.... The
wiretaps in particular gave a vivid picture of Frank
Costello ,as a political boss and an underworld em-
peror.... They reveal him as a king maker who
received calls not only from Judge Aurelio, but also
from Judge Savarese, from Loscalso, whom O'Dwyer
later appointed a judge, and a large assortment of
other political figures. All showed the utmost deference
for the ruler." Special Senate Comm., Tra IN1TEzm
REPORT, op. cit. supra note 6, at 122.
"Mobster Joe. Adonis' influence upon the Kings
County (Brooklyn, N.Y.) Democratic organization
may go far to explain why neither he nor a major
subordinate like Anastasia was ever subjected to
prosecution and punishment." Id. at 185.
7 "Capone, in his heyday, with an estimated annual
income of $250,000,000 from the gambling racket
alone, was one of the big political bosses of the city. In
one election campaign, Capone reputedly made a
political contribution of $250,000 to help elect a
mayor." PETERSON, op. cit. supra note 6, at 37.
78 "S and G [a large Miami area gambling syndicate]
has had a firm grip on the Miami Beach City Council,
which controls the city manager and the police depart-
ment. At least one member of the city council has had
extensive and profitable business transactions with one
member of the S and G Syndicate. The city council
never took any action to interfere with the operations
of the syndicate. The police feared to act without
instructions from above." Special Senate Comm.,
TImRD INTmu REPORT, op. cit. supra note 6, at 11.
79The McClellan Committee delved into this at-
tempted takeover of Portland.
"Involved in this conspiracy was the control of
bookmaking, other gambling, prostitution, punch-
board and pinball operations. The conspiracy extended
to the splitting of profits on underworld activities and
the combined effort of the teamsters and the Portland
underworld to control public officials, principally the
district attorney of the City of Portland, William Lang-
ley." Senate Select Comm., INTERIM. REPORT, op. cit.
supra note 6, at 7.
"Were it not that the conspirators in this particular.
case had a falling out, the Committee believes that
gambling and law enforcement in Portland would now
be completely under the domination of a teamster-
backed underworld." Id. at 39.
0 "The Kefauver Committee report documents the
attempt of Charles Binaggio, a leading Kansas City
racketeer, to name the police commissioner and police
chief for Kansas City by supporting the candidacy of
Forrest Smith for Governor. Smith was elected and did
nominate two police commissioners acceptable to
Binaggio. However, the resultant burst of publicity
was so bright that it was not feasible to open up the
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munities such as Cicero, Illinoisn and Reading,
Pennsylvania,1 have become virtual baronies of
organized crime. Even high ranking state officials
occasionally have been allied with organized
crimePn Our democratic institutions suffer both
in the attainment of such influence by organized
crime and in the methods to which it resorts in
achieving that position.
A political organization, legislator, police force,
prosecutor's office, or judiciary which owes al-
legiance to organized crime cannot render proper
service to the public. The spectacle of a public
servant under the control of men who make a
business of disobeying the laws which he is sworn
to uphold is inconsistent with the fair administra-
tion of justice. When a newly elected judge in
city to gambling, and the incumbent police chief, whom
Binaggio had been most anxious to replace, remained in
office. Shortly thereafter, Binaggio and his chief
lieutenant were murdered in gangland fashion allegedly
for failing to deliver to the organization the wide
open Kansas City he had promised." PETERSON, op. cit.
supra note 64, at 15-17.
81 "The principal cancerous spot in the county, as it
has been for decades, is Cicero. Notorious gambling
joints from which Capone gang leaders admittedly have
amassed huge fortunes continue to flourish here. While
primary responsibility for decent law enforcement in
that municipality rests with the local officers, they
either cannot or will not assume their sworn duties."
PETERSON, A REPORT ON CHICAGO CRass FOR 1955,
at 4 (1956). "When members of the state's attorney's
staff also investigated conditions in Cicero they were
brazenly intimidated by the hoodlums who operated
gambling joints there." Id. at 11.
"The Committee has no difficulty, after reviewing
the Reading testimony and particularly that of Chief
Birney, in arriving at the conclusion that Reading is a
classic example of political strangulation of a police
department at the behest of gambling interests seeking
to thwart any interference with their activities."
Special Senate Comm., FINAL REPORT, op. cit. supra
note 6, at 61.
8 The Attorney General of North Dakota was
successfully prosecuted for agreeing to allow one
organization's slot machines to be distributed in his
state, where such machines are unlawful. See Nilva v.
United States, 227 F.2d 74, 75-76 (8th Cir. 1955).
In Florida, after investigating the sudden state
crackdown on gambling establishments controlled by
the local S and G syndicate, which allowed the Chicago
organization to become established in the Miami area,
the Kefauver Committee concluded that: "There is
more than a casual connection between the fact that
[a front man for the Chicago organization], contributed
$100,000 to Governor Warren's campaign fund and the
fact that [the special state prosecutor] raided only S
and G locations...." Special Senate Comm., TmD
IN- ERi REPORT, op. cit. supra note 6, at 33.
In California, there was evidence of an attempt to
establish a statewide protection system for slot ma-
chines and the distribution of punchboards. "Represent-
atives of the attorney general's office, with the apparent
blessing of Fred Howser, the attorney general, at-
tempted to organize a State-wide system of protection
for slot-machine operations and for the distribution of
punchboards." Id. SEcoND INTERIm REPORT, at 26.
New York City pledged undying loyalty to Frank
Costello, the leading mobster in the city, for pro-
curing his selection to the bench,'" he placed his
office at the disposal of a man who had a vested
stake in an unjust settlement of many matters
which would come before the judge. When the
organization requests, a man in such a position
must protect hoodlums who have committed gam-
bling and narcotic offenses and even murder at the
behest of organized crime8 5 He is no longer a
public servant, selected by and accountable to a
majority of the people, as democracy demands;
he is the employee of a small dass of successful
criminals.
The men attracted to such captive positions
will be neither the most competent nor the most
honest that society has to offer. Thus, the public is
shortchanged in the quality of the decisions made
and services rendered in areas entrusted to govern-
ment.16 Moreover, accustomed to accepting bribes
from a criminal organization, many of these public
servants begin to expect side payments from every-
one as part of their compensation for acts done in
the line of duty 7 And, if the public official's duty
requires a choice between two competing'claimants,
he will lean heavily toward the side which offers
the greatest under-the-table reward rather than
the one whose claim is superior in merit. In many
cities, political organizations dominated by or-
m This event and its background are described in
Special Senate Comm., THm INTRm REPORT, op. cit.
supra note 6, at 122.85 "[O]nce corrupted in areas of commercial illegality,
the corrupt official must continue his illegal cooperation
with the syndicate even when it engages in the most
vicious underworld enforcement violence, such as a
gang murder, or the beating of a defaulting debtor in
a loan shark operation." Special Group on Organized
Crime, supra note 15, at 105.
86 "The failure to act against the criminals who run
gambling and vice enterprises is reflected in law enforce-
ment inefficiency in dealing with other types of crimes.
... The .creeping paralysis of law enforcement which
results from a failure to enforce the gambling laws
spreads to other types of crimes and leads to a general
breakdown in law enforcement." ABA, op. cit. supra
note 16, at 15.
8 The Chicago Crime Commission reports the effect
of having this type of person in public service: "O]n
May 26, 1953, State's Attorney Gutknecht called a
meeting of bailiffs, clerks, deputy sheriffs, bondsmen,
assistant state's attorneys and others connected with
the administration of justice in the Criminal Court
Building. He forthrightly told this assemblage that a
stop must be placed on the practices of extorting or
paying money to see defendants in the bull-pen, paying
money to write bonds or to call cases out of order,
and selling favors instead of freely performing
those lawful services that are the rights of all litigants."
PETERSON, A REPORT ON CmcAGo Ca PoR 1953, at
16 (1954).
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ganized crime have peopled the local government
with minor hoodlums and ex-convicts. The govern-
ment thus loses any sense of allegiance to the public
or to the moral standards which good government
demands. s
Not only does an organization-dominated gov-
ernment become an inappropriate vehicle for the
administration of a democracy, but the election
process itself, the essence of the democratic system,
often is perverted by organized crime to insure the
victory of its candidates. Unwilling to trust its
future to the whims of an honest election, organized
crime and its political allies have bribed and
threatened voters, stuffed ballot boxes, and rigged
the counting of votes.89 Thus, thousands of persons
are defrauded of their most precious right as a
citizen in a democracy, the right to cast a vote
which will count equally with those of other
members of society in determining the makeup of
the body which will govern them.
The political power of organized crime has surged
and waned in American cities according to the
temper of the people. When sufficiently ired by the
unholy alliance between gangster and politician,
the victimized majority will rise up and sweep a
reform ticket into power. If true to its pledge, the
reform group will purge the government of the
incompetent and the corrupt and return it to the
service of the people. However, the traditional
pattern in most cities has been a return of criminal
influence in the municipal government after the
88 "As Pendergast's aide Lazia [gambling czar of
Kansas City] controlled the city police department. By
1934 he had placed on the payroll of that law enforce-
ment agency over 60 ex-convicts. In fact, one out of
every 10 men of the police department had a criminal
record. Kidnappers, robbers, and murderers descended
upon Kansas City. The people were helpless. The law
violators were in control of the law enforcers." PETER-
soN, op. cit. supra note 63, at 15.
8 The subversion of the election process reached a
new high in Chicago under Al Capone. "In one election
campaign, Capone reputedly made a political contribu-
tion of $250,000 to help elect a mayor. Bombings and
gang killings were commonplace in political campaigns.
Vote-buying and vote-stealing reached amazing propor-
tions. On election day, April 1, 1924, the Capone gang,
hungry for more power and without fear of any duly
constituted authority, conducted an armed invasion of
Cicero, Illinois. Gangsters under the personal leadership
of Al Capone, terrorized the entire town from dawn to
dusk. Polling places were manned with machine guns.
Citizens, policemen, and even a few gangsters, were
slugged, shot and killed. It is needless to mention that
Al Capone's candidate was elected." Id. at 37. Al-
though these extremes of violence no longer charac-
terize elections in cities with powerful criminal organi-
zations, the more subtle techniques of vote buying and
ballot stuffing still prevail.
reform fervor has subsided. Either by conquest or
subversion, the local criminal organization slips
back to reclaim its share of political power and
installs some of its own at key positions in the
government.90 Close on the heels of this develop-
ment, the cycle of inefficiency, corruption and
rigged election practices resumes.
H. Tie Undermining of Basic Moral Supports
The preservation of a law-abiding society rests
on the principle of rewarding general conformity
to society's basic standards and punishing non-
conformity. If the highest rewards go to those who
openly disregard the law, and those who conform
to these basic standards receive only the leavings,
this is bound to shake the morale of the law-
abiding. It will be difficult for them to appreciate
the utility of scrupulously obeying the law, when
those who flaunt the law garner the gold.
Each gangland overlord who is able to live for
decades in open splendor and open defiance of the
law serves as an object lesson in the virtues of im-
morality. Unlike burglars, con men, and other
criminals who ply their trade in secret and for
whom discovery usually means disaster, organized
crime operates in the open and depends upon its
purchased immunity for protection.9 Conse-
quently, whereas successful burglars, for example,
by the very secrecy of their success, have very little
impact on the morale and morality of the essen-
tially law-abiding, organized crime, by its very
10 The resurgence of criminal power in Kansas City
after the reform reaction to Boss Tom Pendergast's
corrupt administration exemplifies this pattern.
"Following the gang slaying of Lazia in 1934 and the
subsequent Federal prosecution and conviction of Boss
Tom Pendergast and numerous satellites in the late
1930's the public became aroused. Reform administra-
tions gained control of the local government. Binaggio's
career was temporarily retarded. It was during this
period, however, that he was laying the groundwork
for the future.... Binaggio's power was to gain mo-
mentum until he was to wrest control of this area from
Jim Pendergast, successor to Boss Tom .... Men with
political aspirations sought his assistance. None dared
to repudiate his support. .. . In 1948.. .Binaggio threw
the support of his organization to Forrest Smith who
was elected governor of the state. And almost as soon
as the votes were counted it was apparent that the
gambling king of Kansas City was to be a man of in-
fluence in state affairs." Id. at 15-16.
91 "Most of the top mobsters in various communi-
ties are well known to both law enforcement agencies
and the general public. In some instances they may
have been subjected to prosecution and punishment
in earlier stages of their careers. But once they attain
top positions in the rackets, they achieve a high degree
of immunity from punishment for their criminal opera-
tions." ABA, op. cit. supra note 16, at 13.
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openness and publicity, advertises the profitability
of evil.
This example is especially corruptive of the
group most susceptible to becoming law-breakers:
youth in low income areas.Y With the law-abiding
road which stretches before them strewn with
obstacles and but slim hope of reward, the dear
view of a path paved with gold at but slim risk of
punishment is very tempting. Undoubtedly, many
of this group are lured into a life of crime by what
organized crime teaches about reward and punish-
ment in our society.'3 But the corrosive effect of
this example is not limited to low-income youth.
Although members of middle-class or higher in-
come groups seldom are motivated to undertake a
criminal career by the open success of gangland
chieftains, many questionable compromises with
the legal and moral code probably are attributable
to the cynicism engendered by the favored position
presently enjoyed by society's worst offenders.
I. The Price We Pay
America has never lost a war. Nevertheless it
has been put to plunder for half a century. At the
hands of organized crime, America has endured the
exaction of billions every year, the stifling of free
competition in hundreds of markets, the maiming
and murder of countless human beings, the sys-
tematic cultivation of human weaknesses in our
12 "When a noted criminal is caught, the fact is the
principal topic of conversation among my boys. They
and others lay wagers as to how long it will be before
the criminal is free again, how long it will be before his
pull gets him away from the law. The youngsters soon
learn who are the politicians who can be depended upon
to get offenders out of trouble, who are the dive-keepers
who are protected. The increasing contempt for law is
due to the corrupt alliance between crime and politics,
protected vice, pull in the administration of justice,
unemployment, and a general soreness against the
world produced by these conditions." Statement of a
leading worker with gang boys, quoted in TmHsER,
THE GANG 455 (1927). The demoralizing effect of or-
ganized crime on members of juvenile gangs and its
methods of recruiting new organization members from
these groups are described in chapters 20 and 21 of
Thrasher's book, entitled respectively "The Gang and
Organized Crime," and "The Gang in Politics."
13"In this era of the organization man, the under-
world-like most institutions that prosper within an
established culture-has learned to conform. Its in-
temal structure provides status for those who would
plod along in workaday clothes.... Affiliation with
such an organization is almost irresistible to the youth
who would choose crime as a way of life.... As part of
the underworld, an ambitious youth can rise from body-
guard and hood to a pillar of the community, giving to
charities, dispensing political favors, sending his boys to
West Point and his girls to debutante balls." TYLER, op.
cit. supra note 11, at 228.
population, the fostering of thousands of derivative
crimes, the corruption of sports, the subversion of
democratic institutions, and the crumbling of moral
supports. This is a horrible price for American
society to pay. And yet organized crime continues
unquashed and largely unscathed. The factors
which have combined to allow this parasitic
anomaly to survive and prosper in an essentially
law-abiding society are the subject of the next
section.
II. OBSTACLES To EFrEcivE LEGAL SUPPRESSION
OF ORGANIZED CRIME
Over the past several decades, criminal organiza-
tions in many sections of our nation have managed
to found and sustain vast empires, despite the
fact that virtually all of their activities are unlaw-
ful. There is nothing inevitable about this success.
For the most part organized crime is engaged in
types of criminal activity which are particularly
vulnerable. Unlike burglary, robbery, kidnapping,
and similar crimes which can be accomplished in
a short time at a given place and after which the
criminals can effect an escape to another, gambling
and prostitution, for instance, require a continuing,
usually well publicized operation at the same loca-
tion over a long period of time. Since violations of
law often are repeated every moment of every day
seven days a week at a location which is more or
less open to the public, they are difficult to conceal
from an even moderately alert law enforcement
body.9' But despite this inherent vulnerability to
detection and prosecution, organized 'crime is able
to derive over half its income from gambling.
The factors which allow criminal organizations
to remain immune from efforts to crumble their
illegitimate empires can be grouped into three
broad categories: (A) obstacles to successful pros-
ecution inherent in the size and highly developed
structure of criminal organizations; (B) obstacles
erected by the organization's influence in local
government agencies charged with law enforce-
ment responsibilities; (C) obstacles attributable
to public apathy.
14 "The story... carried an account of an interview
reporters... had with August J. (Gus) Liebe, manager
of [a] crap game. Liebe, who has managed lush gambling
establishments for Capone syndicate leader Rocco
Fishchetti for many years told reporters that the game
was too big to hide. Said Liebe, 'There is no such thing
as sneaking with a big gambling operation. It is bound
to attract a lot of attention. I guess the sheriff doesn't
know his way around."' PETERsoN, A REPORT ON Cm-
CAGO CIMF rOR 1958, at 49 (1959).
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A. The Size and Highly Developed Structure of
Criminal Organizations
Although a criminal organization depends to a
considerable extent upon the umbrella of political
corruption to shelter itself from effective prosecu-
tion, there are other obstacles inherent in the
nature of organized crime which make it more
difficult than other forms of crime for even the
most honest government to suppress.
1. Easy Replacement of Lower Echelon Members of
the Criminal Organization
One of the obstacles in the path of stamping out
organized crime is the fact that organization
members can be easily replaced. The arrest and
convicition of the employees of one of the organiza-
tion's gambling establishments does not seriously
cripple the organization. It merely creates a tem-
porary manpower shortage for that particular
enterprise. Within a short time, new employees
can be recruited, and a new gambling establish-
ment opened, possibly at the same location. A
criminal organization similarly can survive con-
certed drives on its enterprises. As long as enough
high-level members of the organization remain
outside of custody to manage the untouched enter-
prises and to reopen the others, the organization
survives and prospers.
Of course, as is true of any business organiza-
tion, legitimate or illegitimate, the expendability
of a given member of a criminal organization de-
pends upon his position in the organization and
his skill in that position relative to possible suc-
cessors. Naturally, a criminal organization can
lose, through criminal prosecution or otherwise,
almost any number of its lower echelon operatives
without sustaining any damage more serious than
temporary inconvenience. Croupiers, gunmen,
pushers, all can be replaced with relative ease, just
as an automobile manufacturing firm probably
could readily replace many of its secretaries, as-
sembly line personnel, or salesmen, if the need
arose. The dislocations become more serious and
the readjustments more difficult as the duties of
the person convicted become more complex. But
as the ease of replacement of a member of a crimi-
nal organization decreases, the probability that he
can be prosecuted successfully also decreases. 95
95 "Minor members of ... gangs may be imprisoned,
but the top leaders remain relatively untouched by law
enforcement agencies." ABA, REPORT ON ORGANIZED
CRIME AND LAW ENFORcEmENT 13 (1952).
The virtual immunity of these less replaceable
"management-level" members is the basis of the
continuity so essential to the success of any crimi-
nal organization.
2. Immunity from Prosecution of "Management-
Level" Organization Members
At least two factors contribute heavily to the
security of the "management-level" members of a
criminal organization. The first and pivotal factor
is that of insulation. In any criminal organization
of substantial size, the organization leadership
will be insulated by several layers of underlings
from the actual physical acts which constitute the
criminal offenses committed by the organization.98
A gambling raid, for instance, seldom will net any
"management-level" organization members. They
are the brains and the financiers of the criminal
organizations. And, it is the hands, not the brains,
of an organization which commit the overt acts
and are caught if anyone is. Even specialized acts,
such as extortion and murder, usually are com-
mitted by lower echelon members of an organiza-
tion.Y The "management-level" organization mem-
bers ordinarily do not run dice games, push dope,
or solicit for prostitutes. Moreover, it is usual that
the premises on which the organization's illegal
enterprises are conducted will be "owned" and
operated by "front men."99 Consequently, "man-
agement-level" organization members will not be
tied even by legal title to an organization's
illegal enterprises.
The second key element in protecting the or-
ganization leadership from effective prosecution is
the difficulty of obtaining testimony against these
men. In part, this is a problem of identifying all
the witnesses necessary to establish the leader's
96 "Just as with big business, management of the
syndicate acts on a very different level and often miles
away from [the] operation.... [Elach level operates
as insulation to the higher level, .. ." Special Group on
Organized Crime in the United States, op. cit. supra
note 15, at 106.
97 "The killer is generally an imported 'gun.' He
comes from some other part of the country-or some
other country.... He arrives to perform a mission and
he departs when the mission is completed." TYLER, op.
cit. supra note 11, at 229.
8 "In the style of the modern underworld, the mogul
invest[s] his money through a 'trustee' or 'trustees,'...
The contract between the mogul and his trustee is by
word of mouth-the usual contract in the underworld,
observed more punctiliously than most written instru-
ments in the legal world. A man's word is as good as
his bond in the underworld because violation of a con-
tract is not corrected by 'damages' but by death." Id.
at 366-67.
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connection with the crime. Because of the im-
portant phenomenon of insulation, it is necessary
in order to convict these men to forge a chain of
testimony linking them to the overt criminal acts.
Since there may be, in a given case, a number of
intermediaries interposed between the manage-
ment-level members who ordered and financed the
overt criminal acts and the lower-echelon members
who committed the acts, this chain of testimony
often will be extraordinarily long and difficult to
obtain.19 The lower echelon members who are ap-
prehended will not be in a position to testify con-
cerning the involvement of organization leaders.
Their only contact will have been with some minor
functionary who, in turn, took his orders from yet
another mere middleman. Seldom, even if they
wanted to, could the lower echelon members of a
criminal organization provide admissible and
cogent evidence against anyone higher than the
next level in the organization hierarchy.
The problem of obtaining effective testimony
against the leadership of a criminal organization
is compounded by the reluctance of witnesses to
organization crimes to testify against the organiza-
tion. This widespread reluctance is manifest not
only among organization members but also among
innocent bystanders and even the victims of or-
ganization crimes. The innocent bystanders and
victims are dissuaded from testifying by fear of
the atrocities which may be inflicted upon them
or their families by a criminal organization as a
penalty for jeopardizing its activities. This fear
is not always rational. However, it has sufficient
basis in fact 00 to insure the silence of most poten-
tial witnesses against important elements of or-
' [M]embers [of a criminal syndicate] separated by
two or more levels of operation frequently [do not
know] the identity of each other." Special Group on
Organized Crime, supra note 15, at 103.
0 ,,... William Drury, a former acting police cap-
tain .. . was struck in the head with four blasts from a
shotgun ... he was scheduled to furnish information
to the Kefauver Committee on September 26, the day
following his murder." PETERSON, BARBARIANS IN OUR
MmsT 219-60 (1952).
"[I]n 1919, the Mafia murdered an eleven-year-old
boy named Carramusa in Kansas City, a hotbed of
Mafia activities. Follimer [Narcotics Agent] testified:
'The murderer of the Carramusa child was caught red
handed by outraged bystanders and was almost beaten
to death before being arrested by the police. He was
identified as Paul Cantanzaro, but he was never con-
victed, as the host of witnesses were methodically terror-
ized.' " KEFAUVER, CRiMm iN AmEticA 21 (1951).
(Emphasis supplied.)
Other examples of witnesses against whom threats of
murder were carried out are given in note 55, supra.
ganized crime. Others succumb to the offer of a
substantial bribe.10'
Members of a criminal organization, too, are
motivated by fear of physical reprisal should they
offer evidence against their confederates. Organi-
zation members who have threatened to "squeal"
have been administered the quick, violent justice
of organized crime. 0 2 However, the testimonial
silence of these men is attributable equally to
other, more subtle forces. Mixed with the fear are
probably about equal parts of loyalty and a belief
that silence will be rewarded. Behind the loyalty
of minor functionaries lies the fact that most
criminal organizations are stable, well-paying
employers who treat dependable employees fairly
and who stand ready to re-employ lower echelon
members at above-market wages upon their release
from government custody. At higher levels in an
organization hierarchy, this amorphous sense of
loyalty has hardened into a strict almost religious
code of silence. 1n The Mafia-related organizations
call this strict observance of silence omerta. But
the attribute is not confined to these, groups; ob-
servers agree it is one characteristic common to
almost all criminal organizations." 4
The rewards which criminal, organizations hold
out to all members, high and low, who refuse to
cooperate with law enforcement officers serve
further to reinforce the motives of fear and loyalty
tending to produce silence. One of the chief rewards
is monetary. For those who maintain silence, there
often will be regular support payments for their
families during their imprisonment, as well as
bonuses and promotion upon release. 05° Another
101 Special Senate Comm., SEcoND IN znm REPORT,
op. cit. supra note 6, at 8.
2 Some of the murders cited in note 55, supra, were
organization members who contemplated testifying
against principal figures in their own organization.
Three of the 15 gangland murders in Chicago during
1961 were committed against persons alleged to be
police informers associated with organized crime in
that city. See note 58 supra. Thus, it is not difficult to
see why Tyler concludes that: "The 'insiders,' the mem-
bers of the organization who are involved, are little
trouble.... The punishment meted out to them if they
do turn state's evidence is merciless and virtually in-
escapable." TLER, op. cit. supra note 11, at 231.
13 [T]he code of secrecy makes it almost impossible
to get a member to give evidence against his
brethren, ... [The] code... is not something reduced
to writing, and is rarely even spoken about-it is second
nature. Members are only taken into the organization
after they have proved their right to membership in
some positive fashion, such as by adherence to the code
in the face of extreme danger." Special Group on Or-
ganized Crime, supra note 15, at 104.
114 See note 102 supra.
105 "[WIhen a member of the mob goes to jail, he
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form of reward offered obedient members is the
services of organization attorneys in defending
them in the criminal proceedings. 10 6 Mforeover,
in many cities, through its influence over the local
public officials, a criminal organization is able to
guarantee acquittal or at the least a minimum
sentence to any member who observes the code
of silence. 1' 7
As the foregoing discussion suggests, criminal
organization exerts potent pressures upon potential
witnesses, and particularly upon the organization
membership. Serving to magnify the effectiveness
of these pressures is the fact that several levels of
personnel insulate the organization leadership from
the criminal acts. Because of this insulation, it is
not necesary to obtain the silence of every witness.
If one weak link can be found who will yield to the
organization out of fear, loyalty, or in hope of
reward, the prosecution's chain of testimony will
collapse, and the security of the organization
leadership will be preserved.
3. The Fractionalization of the Law Eiorcenmient
Effort Against Organized Crime
Jurisdiction over most of the crimes committed
by criminal organizations is entrusted to a patch-
work of local and state law enforcement agencies,
each segment of which is hemmed in by artificial
boundaries, limited powers, and restricted respon-
sibilities.108 Beyond their own territories these law
carries with him the protection of the organization ....
The 'home office' protects him against bullies, gets him
preferred cells and the softer job, works on parole-and,
most important, takes care of his family." TYrR, op.
cit. supra note 11, at 233.
106 "The gang has means of protecting its mem-
bers .... Expensive and able counsel is provided. One
of the peculiar coincidences that occurred time after
time was the revelation that the identical lawyer ap-
peared for many of the bookmakers working for the
same major outfit. In Miami, Ben Cohen, brother of
one of the members of the S. & G. Syndicate turned up
as counsel for many of the bookmakers who were
arrested there." Special Senate Comm., SECOND IN-
TERiS REPORT, op. cit. supra note 6, at 8.
107 "Even where a conviction is ultimately obtained,
an effort is made to keep the sentence as light as possi-
ble or to obtain an early release on parole .... [In
Chicago] underlings occasionally receive punishment,
almost without exception, of a minor kind." Id. at 8-9.
108 "Law enforcement is administered by Federal,
State, and local governments.... In the non-Federal
area, encompassing perhaps 90 percent or more of all
crime, there are 49 States, plus the District of Colum-
bia. Each of these subdivisions is broken down further
into numerous smaller political units. Thus, there are
thousands of State, city, county, and special police
units and State attorney generals, district attorneys,
and special prosecutors." Special Group on Organized
Crime, supra note 15, at 106.
enforcement units are unable to conduct investiga-
tions, enforce subpoenas, or initiate prosecutions.10 9
Organized crime has been alert to seize upon this
characteristic flaw in the structure of law enforce-
ment. Unfettered by such inflexible jurisdictional
restrictions, a criminal organization typically will
range freely over a broad geographical area which
overlaps many discrete governmental entities. The
organization will purposely structure its activities
to obtain optimum advantage from the boundaries
separating the jurisdictional units within its area
of operation and from the uneven standards of
honesty and competence prevailing in the law
enforcement bodies within these units.
By concentrating its illegal enterprises in those
self-governing hamlets or "strips" within a metro-
politan area which have small, largely untrained
police forces and no investigators, or which are
easily corrupted, a criminal organization often is
able to protect these operations from detection
and effective prosecution. This strategy is well
illustrated by the situation prevailing in Cook
County, Illinois. Wide-open gambling for the most
part has been driven out of Chicago proper. It
now thrives in many villages on the fringes of the
city such as Cicero and Calumet City.n0
While concentrating the organization's illegal
operations in jurisdictions where they can dominate
the law enforcement machinery, the major figures
in a criminal organization often will maintain their
residences in a plush residential neighborhood in a
109 Some of the problems attendant upon such a di-
vision of jurisdiction over organization activities is sug-
gested in the report of the Attorney General's special
group. "[Tihe leaders can remove themselves from the
subpoena power of any particular local prosecutor.
Even the most vigorous local district attorney finds it
virtually impossible to investigate where the real cul-
prits are outside his subpoena jurisdiction .... No
matter how great his desire to cooperate, a detective in
one city cannot know what an assistant district at-
torney in a distant city needs to piece together a
complex syndicated crime pattern." Id. at 106-07.
110 "Although there was little wide-open gambling in
Chicago proper in 1959, the situation was considerably
different in many localities in Cook County beyond the
city limts where Syndicate bigwigs were reaping a
fortune from gambling operations." PaTEsoN, A
REPORT ON CHICAGO CR Fop 1959, at 52 (1960).
"The principal cancerous spot in the county, as it has
been for decades, is Cicero. Notorious gambling joints
from which Capone gang leaders admittedly have
amassed huge fortunes continue to flourish there."
PETERSON, A REPORT ON CHICAGO CRMue FOR 1955, at
4 (1956). "When members of the state's attorney's
staff. . .investigated co4ditions in Cicero they were
brazenly intimidated by the hoodlums who operated
gambling joints there." PETERs N, A REPORT ON
CHIcAGO CwRs FOR 1954, at 11 (1955).
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different jurisdiction far removed from the locus
of these illegal enterprises. In Detroit, for example,
most of the underworld overlords occupy estates
in Grosse Point, an exclusive and highly respectable
suburb with not a tinge of the vice or illicit busi-
nesses which are the basis of their fortunes. Thus,
the police officers and prosecutors who have juris-
diction over organization businesses will not have
jurisdiction over the men chiefly responsible for
the perpetuation of these businesses.
Sometimes, if the geography is suitable and their
lines of control cohesive, organization leaders will
place a state boundary between themselves and
their illegal enterprises. 1 ' This provides an added
measure of security from effective prosecution.
In other localities, the organization leadership
must rely upon the even more artificial lines which
divide city from county and county from village.
But, in either case, through proper planning a
criminal organization usually can manage to isolate
both its primary illegal operations and its leaders
from the vast bulk of the law enforcement resources
which confront it in a metropolitan area.
B. Corruption of the Agencies Charged with Law
Enforcement
Because of the factors discussed above, even the
most capable and dedicated law enforcement
machinery would face a formidable opponent in a
tightly knit, well organized criminal syndicate. The
easy replacement of its minor functionaries, the
relative immunity of its leaders because of their
insulation from the criminal acts and the difficulties
in obtaining testimony against them, and its ability
to structure its operations to take advantage of
our decentralized system of government combine
to render organized crime the most difficult of all
criminal adversaries. But organized crime has not
been satisfied to rely on this inherent strength. It
has purchased additional insurance by corrupting,
as much as possible, the law enforcement machin-
ery which opposes it. n12 Through this technique the
nt "In another instance, the scene of illicit operations
is close to the border of the State. This location is in
the Midwest. One individual travels daily between the
two States. He conducts his layoff business in the one
State and lives in a $200,000 house in the suburbs of a
large city across the border in another State.
"I might say,... this particular individual lives in
the State of Ohio. All the bad things are going on in
another State." Statement of Robert F. Kennedy,
Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 5, supra note 15, at
22.
112 "The largest single factor in the breakdown of law
enforcement agencies in dealing with organized crime
criminal organization has been able to purchase
virtual immunity not only for its "management-
level" members, but also for its lower echelon
members and all its widespread and otherwise often
vulnerable illegal enterprises.
Effective law enforcement depends upon an in-
terlocking team made up of police, prosecutors,
judges, and legislators. Of course, a criminal or-
ganization does not corrupt every official at every
level of law enforcement. What it feels necessary
to its security, and what it usually succeeds in
accomplishing, is to corrupt some officials at each
level. Through this technique, it is able ordinarily
to neutralize any sporadic attempts to destroy
the criminal organization which might emanate
from a single dedicated individual or group of
individuals at one level of law enforcement, for
the other levels will be sufficiently riddled with
persons amenable to organization pressure to
frustrate such efforts.
The currency used to purchase corruption is
varied. Some officials are bought with money.113
Others are bought with votes or the funds with
which to purchase votes.114 Many other politicians
is the corruption and connivance of many public offi-
cials." ABA, op. cit. supra note 16, at 16.
113 "This is typified by such items as the $1,000,000 a
year protection money paid by the Gross bookmaking
empire in New York City, the $152,000 a month paid to
police officials in Philadelphia, not to interfere with
gambling, the $7-11,000 at a time turned over by a
deputy sheriff of Dade County, Florida, to the wife of
the Sheriff, the $108,000 'juice' entry on the books of
the Guarantee Finance Co., a bookmaking operation in
Los Angeles." Id. at 16-17.
"Alexender Heard, in his book on campaign finances,
estimates that organized crime currently pays for fif-
teen per cent of campaign expenditures at state and
local levels. In 1952 that would have been some $16
million-ten times the national contribution of or-
ganized labor." Moynihan, The Prilate Government of
Crime, The Reporter, July 6, 1961, p. 14 at 18.
"1 "The sinister influence of gangsters like Frank
Costello and Joe Adonis in the Democratic organiza-
tions of Manhattan and Brooklyn, respectively, the
extraordinary attempt by the gangster politician
Binaggio to acquire control of the police board of Kan-
sas City, so that he could put in his own man as chief,
the large contributions made to Governor Fuller
Warren's campaign in Florida by a known associate of
the Capone gang are but a few typical examples of the
abuse of the political process to further the interests of
gambling and racketeering elements." Id. at 17. "There
is considerable evidence in the minutes of the testimony
concerning contributions to political campaigns by
gamblers and gangsters. For example, William Molasky
contributed $2,500 to the gubernatorial campaign in
Missouri in hope that he would be given the right to
name a member of the St. Louis Police Board .... The
fact that Emilio Georgetti 'the Gambling King of San
Mateo County' in California, worked like a beaver for
the election of Sheriff McGrath and 'accumulated a
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bow to a criminal organization not to obtain sup-
port but to avoid incurring the opposition of such
a formidable political opponent. A fourth category
succumb to the wishes of their superiors in the
political organization who in turn have been
bought with money or votes, in order to retain
their present positions, or to secure advancement
to higher ones. Still others are threatened or black-
mailed into cooperation.11 5 Whatever the mode of
payment, the result is the same--the official, be
he policeman, prosecutor, judge, or legislator,
serves a second master, rather than the public, in
certain cases. In the event the criminal organiza-
tion is involved, he will act, fail to act, or act
ineptly, whichever will better serve the organiza-
tion's purposes." 6
The role which a corrupted official may play in
subverting effective law enforcement action against
a criminal organization naturally depends upon the
function which that official performs within the
law enforcement machinery.
1. Corruption Within the Police Force or Investigative
Agency
Corrupt policemen and investigators are able
to serve a criminal organization in at least two
ways. First, they can fail to "see" or report infrac-
tions of the law committed by members of the
criminal organization in their presence or in the
presence of men under the corrupt official's super-
vision. Thus, gambling houses, houses of prostitu-
tion, and dope pushers can remain "undetected"
in certain "safe" areas which are policed by those
sympathetic to the syndicate?' 7 Second, corrupted
little money for the campaign,' did not hurt him in his
gambling operations." Special Senate Comm., SEcoND
INTERim REPORT, op. cit. supra note 6, at 29.
115 The use of prostitutes by criminal organizations
to acquire useful blackmail material against high
government officials with which to obtain their coopera-
tion is described in ANSLINGER, TnE MuRDERERs:
THE STORY OF E NARcOTIC GANGs (1961).
116 "Wherever organized criminal gangs are en-
trenched in a particular community and have been given
the green light to operate, it is not unusual to see the
forces of law enforcement being used against their com-
petitors, while protected enterprises are left severely
alone .... In the Miami story, we saw this weapon of
unequal enforcement of the law by a State official being
used against the S & G as one of the weapons to compel
it to capitulate to the demands of Accardo-Guzik-
Fischetti crime syndicate." Special Senate Comm.,
THIRD INTERnm REPORT, op. cit. supra note 6, at 182.
117 "The underworld has its links with the police, the
individual copper who walks his beat. His pay is low;
his life is dull; his future is limited. But in an entent
cordiale with the underworld, he can find new horizons;
highly increased pay; women and wine; a quick financial
persons within the police department or investiga-
tive agency can furnish warnings to the organiza-
tion when arrest or search warrants are issued or
other positive action is contemplated against or-
ganization members or enterprises. A quick phone
call can enable a flourishing gambling casino to be
transformed into an innocent appearing restaurant
before a police raiding party can complete the
journey from the precinct station. With sufficient
infiltration of the police department or investiga-
tive agency the criminal organization can remain
fully appraised of its opponent's every move and
thereby take action to render these moves ineffec-
tive.
2. Corruption of Local Prosecutors
Useful as "ownership" of a goodly number of
policemen may be to the criminal organization,
no dollar of corruption buys as much protection as
the dollar which directly or indirectly influences
the public prosecutor or one of his trusted assist-
ants."" It is with the prosecutor that the most
crucial decision rests-to prosecute or not to prose-
cute. To control the man who makes this decision
is to sit at the steering wheel of the law enforce-
ment machine. If the criminal organization can
actually control the head local prosecutor, it has
complete and indestructible immunity. This is the
degree of influence which the organization would
like to wield; it is doubtful that it usually succeeds.
On the other hand, there are probably not many
prosecutor's offices in major cities in this country
in which the criminal organization swings no
weight at all.
The organization's purposes are well served
even if the prosecutor is honest, if he will only be
more or less indifferent. The other obstacles stand-
ing in the way of enforcing the laws against the
criminal organization are so formidable that only
positive, creative action originating in the prose-
cutor's office can possibly seriously undermine the
killing. The temptation to make a deal with the under-
world especially when it appears to harm nobody, is as
alluring as it is common. Starting with a weekly stipend
for closing one eye at a gambling joint, the sum-and
the involvement-multiply as the cops and robbers
convert traditional antipathy into mutual assistance.
When, on occasion, the operation of the business calls
for violence the local constabulary is cast in the role of
accomplice in absentia." TYLR, op. cit. supra note 11,
at 231.
ns "If the DA can be reached-indeed, if the under-
world can put its own man in the DA's office-then the
crime organization can guarantee a high level of security
to its employees." Ibid.
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organization's success. Consequently, if they can
be blessed with a less than dedicated or less than
capable chief prosecutor, the members of the
criminal organization are usually satisfied. Through
their substantial contributions to political parties,
criminal organizations are usually able to guide the
party nominations toward men who fit this pattern
or at least who are known not to harbor any abiding
determination to fight the organization.
In addition to suppressing prosecutions against
the criminal organization, influence within the
prosecutor's office can be felt in other ways. A case
which is lost is nearly as ineffectual in stopping
organized crime as a case never begun. Thus, a
case intentionally lost is nearly as valuable to the
organization as a case intentionally never begun.
Payoffs to assistants on the prosecutor's staff can
yield handsome dividends, especially when the
chief prosecutor is honest enough to commence
prosecution of organized crime cases which are
dropped in his lap, but too indifferent actively to
seek such cases or insure their diligent handling by
his subordinates. Last, infiltration of the prose-
cutor's staff becomes especially important if the
chief prosecutor himself is one of those few men
dedicated to the destruction of organized crime.
In that case, knowledge of his overall strategy
and current moves is highly valuable to the orga-
nization in warding off his blows.
3. Corruption of the Judiciary
Another phase of law enforcement in which
criminal organizations often capture some influence
is the judiciary. Although there is very little evi-
dence that organized crime has been able to achieve
any success in the appellate courts, there is every
reason to believe that the trial courts of some of
our large cities are liberally sprinkled i;ith judges
who are indebted in one way or another to the
predominant local criminal organization." 9
Whether elected with the aid of the organization
or appointed by persons who themselves were so
elected, the debt to the organization is there. The
specie of repayment of that debt may take any
one of several forms.
The first stage of the proceedings at which a
corrupt trial judge can be of use to the organization
1"9 For example, several judges in New York City
owed their selection to the bench to the political man-
euverings of Frank Costello and acknowledged this debt
in telephone calls to their benefactor. See, Special
Senate Comm., Tinx Iumrm REPORT, op. cit. supra
note 6, at 121-24.
is at a police request for the issuance of search or
arrest warrants. Although it is difficult for a judge
to deny such a warrant if the evidence justifies
issuance, a tip-off to the organization that the
warrant has been granted usually renders the war-
rant as ineffectual as if it had been denied. This
is particularly true in the case of premises used for
gambling and related crimes, where the premises
can be converted into an innocent appearing front
in a matter of minutes.
The next proceeding at which the judge's non-
reviewable discretion can be abused for the benefit
of organized crime is at a hearing on a'motion to
suppress evidence alleged to have been illegally
seized. Since the heart of most gambling and nar-
cotics cases is the physical evidence seized during
a "raid," the suppression of such evidence ordi-
narily will defeat .the prosecution's case.
At the- trial itself, the judge again can be of
service to a criminal organization. Most cases in-
volving the crimes of the criminal organization are
bench trials. Consequently, the judge has power to
decide the case on the merits, even against the
most overwhelming weight of the evidence, for the
organization defendant. Even in a jury trial the
judge can influence the outcome. Moreover, in
neither a bench nor jury trial does the state have
the right to appeal .12 The most prejudicial conduct
of the judge, or the most outlandish decision by
him, cannot be challenged in the higher courts.
The only check on such a judge is the repercussions
which might follow exposure of his conduct to the
glare of publicity in newspapers and other news
media.
4. Corruption of the Legislature
There is strong evidence to support the conclu-
sion that the long black hand of organized crime
reaches into the legislative chambers of some of
'our larger states. Although probably never muster-
ing a majority or even a near majority, blocs of
legislators bound closely to organized crime have
been successful in defeating remedial legislation
aimed at suppressing the criminal organizationR
120 "Some of the abuses in the criminal courts which
defeat justice could be partially reduced at least through
the exercise of sound discipline by the courts. Not too
much can be expected from this source, however; rulings
in favor of the defendant and against the prosecution
are generally not appealable." PETERSON, A REPORT ON
CIHCAGO CRI=M for 1959, at 19 (1960).
121 "Substantial testimony was adduced before the
committee that certain members of the State legislature,
particularly those living in districts most heavily in-
fested by racketeers, fought against legislation designed
to curb gangster activities and urged for passage by the
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The technique relied upon to accomplish this
purpose has been the old legislative game of vote-
trading. By promising support for legislation
greatly desired by other legislators, the organiza-
tion bloc garners votes against any measures likely
to seriously injure the interests of organized crime.
In states having a large rural representation in the
legislature, such votes are not difficult to come by.
Since organized crime is no problem to the rural
legislator, he is often quite wliling to sacrifice pro-
grams designed to suppress organized crime in
order to further a bill which appeals strongly to
his constituents.
5. The Strategy of Political Corruption
Organized crime has a large stake in political
corruption. Without it, many of the illegal enter-
prises operated by the criminal organization would
be difficult if not impossible to keep in business.
The secret of effective corruption is to have in-
fluence over some key persons at every level of
government which has anything to do with law
enforcement. This diversified corruption has two
advantages to an organization. First, it tends to
thwart any intensive effort against the organization
by one dedicated man or group of men located in
one or two departments. Since any successful drive
against organized crime ordinarily requires the
cooperation or at least the full acquiescence of all
levels of law enforcement, the organization is usu-
ally fairly safe as long as all the departments of
government do not become honest at once. The
second advantage of diversified corruption is the
effect it is likely to have upon morale within all
law enforcement agencies. Each member of each
agency finds it easier to excuse his own yielding to
organization pressure when he feels that his own
efforts to oppose the law against a criminal organi-
zation would be of no avail, since so many others
in law enforcement serve the organization. The
vigorous Chicago Crime Commission, and associate
freely with their gangster constituents. Roland
Libonati, Democratic State senator from the West Side,
and a close associate of Capone's, spearheaded the oppo-
sition to the reform legislation proposed by the Chicago
Crime Commission and Governor Stevenson and backed
by the bar. Representative James J. Adducci, Republi-
can member of the bipartisan coalition against reform,
has represented Chicago's West Side for 17 years.
Adducci has been arrested a number of times in com-
pany with Capone mobsters and admitted to accept-
ing campaign contributions from Lawrence Mangano,
a well-known figure in the Capone hierarchy, ..."
Special Senate Comm., THiRD INzETRm REPORT, op. cit.
supra note 6, at 59.
more that have been corrupted, the easier it is to
corrupt the remainder.
C. Public Indiffereiwe to the Threat of Organized
Crime
The bedrock of organized crime's success is
public indifference and lack of knowledge con-
cerning the evils of organized crime and the means
of dealing with it.
The term public indifference embraces a multi-
plicity of attitudes tending to create a social atmos-
phere favorable to organized crime. The public
attitude can range from mere apathy toward or-
ganized crime, 12 the attitude prevailing in most
American communities, to active public support
for the criminal organization dominant in a given
area. Examples of the latter fortunately are rela-
tively rare; this is fortunate, because an organiza-
tion which maintains its headquarters and confines
its operations primarily within a geographical area
where the residents openly and actively assist is
doubly difficult to combat. One of the largest
criminal organizations in Brooklyn, headed by the
Gallo Brothers, occupies such an advantageous
position. The people of the Market Street area,
the ethnically homogeneous community where the
Gallo Brothers gang is based, are friendly to the
organization and its activities and antagonistic to
law enforcement officers and their efforts against
the Gallos. Thus, added to the normal obstacles
confronting government agents are several thou-
sand organization sympathizers bent on hampering
their actions. A raid on organization activities or
even surveillance of its members is virtually
impossible because the neighborhood residents
quickly identify any "stranger," make his presence
known, and often hasten his exit from the area.
The more usual public attitude is not the active
cooperation with organized crime which prevails
in Market Street, but rather passive tolerance of
organization activities. It is the attitude which
shrugs off corruption of public officials, gangland
style murders, and wide open gambling and other
forms of vice as inherent, inevitable, or not particu-
larly bad. And, it is the attitude which prevents
key anti-crime legislation from being enacted,
allows corrupted officials to remain in office, and
denies law enforcement officers needed testimony
against organized crime.23 The lack of concern
'1 "In the course of its investigations, the committee
has seen numerous examples of public apathy toward
the operations of organized crime and its alliance with
officials at various levels of government." Id. at 187.
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among the many allows the interested few to
determine the magnitude and direction of the
government response to organized crime.
Nor is this attitude of indifference and tolerance
prevalent only among members of the general
public. It is common, as well, among many legis-
lators, judges, and other public officials. At this
level indifference is particularly debilitating to any
drive against organized crime. The bought and
paid for pro-organization lobby will have an easier
time defeating effective anti-crime legislation when
the rest of the legislature feels no stake in its pas-
sage. And, judges who see no threat in the activities
of organized crime mete out inconsequential sen-
tences to bookmakers, loan sharks, dope pushers,
and racketeers.m
The indifference concerning organized crime
which has prevailed in most areas of the United
States during most periods of our history is the
product of many factors deeply imbedded in the
nature of organization activities, its mode of opera-
tion, and the character of the American society
upon which it feeds. One social observer has coa-
lesced these factors into a rationale which seeks
not merely to explain the success of organized crime
in America, nor to excuse it, but to ensconce it in
the role of a positive force for the elevation of
minority immigrant groups into their proper sta-
tion in American society.125 If valid, this thesis
would also tend to justify the indifference which
majority elements in the society have demon-
in "In the State of Illinois .... the committee found
evidence that numerous local law-enforcement officials
made no effort to interfere with illegal gambling opera-
tions. More shocking than the defection of individual
law-enforcement officials was the testimony before the
committee that many of these men were elected and re-
elected by a voting public which was well aware of their
tolerance of illegal gambling." Special Senate Comm.,
THIRD INTERIM REPORT, op. cit. supra note 6, at 187.
12 Symptomatic of the prevalence of this view among
judges are the sentencing practices adhered to by most
Federal judges in wagering tax cases. Of the 482 de-
fendants convicted for violations of the Federal Wager-
ing Tax statutes in 1961, only 57 were given prison
sentences. This figure represents a mere 11.8% of the
defendants convicted. Moreover, only two of this 57
were sentenced to more than one year in prison. Sta-
tistics obtained from the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts.
126 "lIlt was.., the ... racketeer, seeking to become
respectable, who provided one of the major supports
for the drive to win a political voice for Italians in the
power structure of the urban political machines." BELL,
op. cit. supra note 11, at 143.
"[Clrime, in the language of the sociologists, has a
'functional' role in the society, and the urban rackets-
the illicit activity organized for continuing profit,
rather than individual illegal acts-is one of the queer
ladders of mobility in American life." Id. at 129.
strated toward the phenomenon of organized crime.
However, while under close scrutiny these under-
lying social factors may serve to explain the ex-
istence of public indifference, they hardly excuse
it.126
The bulk of organization income is not derived
from criminal activity which deprives others of
their property by force or overt chicanery. Rather,
it is obtained from enterprises such as gambling,
prostitution, narcotics, shylocking, and legitimate
businesses in which organized crime provides
people with commodities or services which they
desire. Accordingly, organized crime does not ordi-
narily create a class of irate victims who with their
families and friends would demand retribution
from the law as do the victims of robberies, bur-
glaries and rapes.is7 People who do not generally
126The concept described by Bell of leading racke-
teers as patriotic leaders of their ethnic group striving
through their criminal activities to advance the social
and political status of theiF people is intriguing, but
hardly squares with the facts. It is his own destiny
and not that of his ethnic group which a racketeer seeks
to promote. In most instances, a racketeer rises by ex-
ploitation of his own people more than of -any majority
group in the nation. The Mafia protection racket rested
primarily upon extortion from fellow Sicilian and Italian
immigrants rather than from nationality groups already
integrated into the main society. The leading numbers
games and other forms of organized gambling take more
money from members of minority groups than from any
other segment of our population. And criminal organiza-
tions promote the distribution of narcotics among mem-
bers of their own nationality groups with at least as
much zest as they push this product with others. The
bribes which are paid to public officials are not offered in
exchange for increased political power for, as Bell
would suggest, the racketeer's ethnic group, but for the
protection of the illegal activities of his criminal organi-
zation. Organization leaders have shown no preference
for members of their own racial stock in promoting
the political careers of persons whom they favor. They
look for allegiance to the criminal organization and will
reward that attitude in whomever it may appear. If
they tend to further the political aspirations of some of
their own people, it is because they know and trust
these people. That ethnic patriotism, conscious or un-
conscious, was not the motivating force behind the
growth of organized crime is amply demonstrated by the
fact that many prominent organization leaders have
come from ethnic stock which never was in the minority
in America. Bell, himself, points out that the leading
hoodlums of the Far West and South generally bear
definitely Anglo-Saxon names. Moreover, the "mission"
ascribed to the Italian and Jewish criminal organiza-
tions by Bell---achievement of political parity for their
respective ethnic groups-has long since been com-
pleted; nevertheless, these organizations show no dispo-
sition to cease their plunder of American society.
127 "Syndicated crime has turned largely to extremely
profitable and relatively risk-free crimes in which, for
practical purposes, there is no individual victim. In-
deed, in many cases the conspiracy actually brings the
victim into its fold as a co-conspirator.
"Examples of this type of crime are antitrust,
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patronize the illegal businesses conducted by or-
ganized crime likewise are not aroused by most of
these crimes. With the exception of narcotics, these
are activities which the majority of Americans do
not consider immoral.232 It does not automatically
follow, as some would suggest, that they are ac-
tivities which should therefore be legalized. In the
management of our society, many things not con-
sidered immoral are rendered illegal for purposes
of social regulation and the proper channeling of
resources. 129 But most people think in moralistic
terms and are loathe to become concerned over
acts they do not consider wholly immoral. 30 Until
the public becomes more sophisticated and realizes
that a group which organizes to violate systemati-
cally our laws aimed at social regulation can be
just as dangerous to society as one which concen-
trates on more "evil" crimes, the average citizen,
legislator, and judge will not be seriously concerned
about organized criminal activity in its current
form.
Further lulling society into a sense of apathy is
the innocuous face which organized crime turns
toward the general public, as a result of the basic
compartmentalization of functions which charac-
terizes a criminal organization. Most persons would
gambling, and even narcotics violations. In all of these
the victim usually becomes a party to the crime. Thus,
in the antitrust violation, the businessman joins the
combination because he is afraid or considers it profit-
able to eliminate competition; in the gambling opera-
tion, the bettor is a necessary participant without
whose willing cooperation there could be no crime; in
the narcotics transaction, the user is vitally concerned
with the continuance of supply and often engages in
other crimes to assure this supply." Special Group on
Organized Crime, supra note 17, at 105.
128 "Most crime consists of breaking laws that even
the most determined evangelist would have to admit
were Ceasar's, not God's." RIcE, THE BusINEss oF
CR xi-xii (1956).
229 "In the interest of public welfare we have found
the need to curb and control through prohibitory legisla-
tion, the strongest and most prevalent of human im-
pulses. Laws against adultery, rape and prostitution (for
instance) have not entirely prevented these offenses
from being committed. But the mere presence of these
laws and their partial enforcement have had very
salutory effects." PETERsoN, SHOULD GAmBLiNG BE
LEGALIZED? 47 (1946).
130 "One extremely significant fact about the
businessman-crook is that he can survive in our society
a good deal more easily than most other criminals be-
cause he has considerably more moral standing .... We
are taught from the cradle up that the more or less un-
bridled expression of the acquisitive instinct is not only
normal but socially constructive.... If we get wind of a
conspiracy to hold up a bank, most of us automatically
holler, '-elpl Police!' But if we get wind of a conspiracy
to sell merchandise at a discount, few of us do." RIcE,
op. cit. supra note 128, at xii.
loathe and fear dope peddlers, labor racketeers
and professional killers; but those are not the
specialists with whom the general public is most
familiar. The only element of a criminal organiza-
tion with whom they generally will be acquainted
is the neighborhood- bookie. The cigar store or
newsstand bookmaker, typically an independent
contractor with the local criminal organization,
neither appears nor, in fact, is a vicious or dan-
gerous immoral person himself. His connection
with the vicious and immoral central organization
is obscure to members of the general public who
frequent his establishment or know of his exist-
ence.13' The unsophisticated readily succumb to
the shallow syllogism that since the corner book-
maker is not dangerous and since he is a part of
organized crime, therefore, organized crime must
not be a group to fear.
Although these natural circumstances which
tend to induce public apathy are well entrenched
in the fabric of American society, organized crime
does not entrust as important an aspect of its
strength as apathy to the coincidence of natural
circumstance. Criminal organizations employ
public relations firms to foster their public image
as innocuous benefactors of society. 2 Items are
planted in syndicated gossip columns painting
leading racketeers in a favorable light. Shortly
after the Apalachin meeting was uncovered, re-
ports were leaked to the press that the purpose of
the meeting was to withdraw organized crime from
the business of distributing narcotics. Thus persons
naive enough to believe this well-publicized ex-
planation were left with an impression that or-
ganized crime was nothing to fear since it was
voluntarily relinquishing participation in the really
immoral activities. Nothing which has occurred
since the Apalachin conference would suggest there
was any accuracy in this rumor. Organized crime
remains very much in the narcotics racket. But
similar improbable folk tales constantly circulate
31 "Most people seem unable to feel strongly against
the local 'bookie' even though illegal gambling is by
far the largest single source of syndicated crime profit."
Special Group on Organized Crime, supra note 15, at
105.
132 "Along with the graduation of syndicated crime
into commercial areas has come an ever-increasing use
of the techniques of modern public relations to deceive
the public, create the appearance of legitimacy and
enable close relationships with important public
officials." Id. at 106. It should be noted that one of the
areas of legitimate commerce in which organized crime
has made substantial investments is advertising. See,
Special Senate Comm., TArmn IhrER RPoRT, op. cit.
supra note 6, at 171.
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in the press, many undoubtedly emanating from
the public relations experts retained by organized
crime, and all contributing to the image of or-
ganized crime as a benevolent conspiracy which
would never intentionally harm any law-abiding
citizen. To further reinforce this image, organiza-
tion leaders often assume the pose of public spirited
citizens. They contribute heavily and publicly
to charity, participate wherever possible in com-
munity affairs, take up residence in quiet, respect-
able suburbs, send their children to fine schools,
and associate with any of the leading citizenry who
feel compelled to accept their company.l
To pierce the facade of pseudo-respectability
and the illusion of harmlessness which natural
circumstance and deliberate propagandizing has
afforded organized crime, requires a quantity of
knowledge and a level of sophistication not pos-
sessed by the majority of Americans. It requires
a familiarity with the many facets of a criminal
'1 "It is established practice for big-time gamblers
and gambling syndicates to contribute generously to
charities, fraternal organizations, and other worthy
causes as part of their program to ingratiate them-
selves with the community and convince the public
that while more or less illegal, their activities are thor-
oughly moral." Special Senate Comm., TrmRD IN-
TERIU REPORT, op. cit. supra note 6, at 187.
organization's activity and the indirect as well as
the direct consequences these may have for our
citizens. There must be an appreciation of the in-
sidious connection between organized gambling
and murder, between loan sharking and extortion,
between racketeer infiltration of legitimate com-
merce and poorer quality at higher prices. And
there must be an understanding of the close re-
lation between all these enterprises of organized
crime and the conversion of democratic institu-
tions from instruments for governing the law-
abiding majority to tools for profiting the lawless
few.
A measure of sophistication was instilled in some
members of society by the shocking revelations
of the Kefauver and McClellan Committee in-
vestigations. And a more active and successful
campaign against organized crime has been the
result. However, too many people, among them
many judges and legislators, still regard that
campaign only as a coordinated drive against a
collection of individuals who merely violate some
gambling and prostitution laws which have no
deep moral significance in current American so-
ciety. No over-simplification of complex reality
was ever more erroneous; none was ever more
dangerous.
